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I. INTRODUCTION
By virtue of his announcement of his Second Law of Motion (now
known as F=ma), Sir Isaac Newton succeeded in doing three things.
First, Newton succeeded not only in isolating crucially relevant force-
determining variables from a host of candidate variables, but also in dem-
onstrating succinctly and definitively the relationship among those vari-
ables.2 Second, by his equation, Newton was able to resolve the
1. Where F = Force, m = mass, and a = acceleration. Newton announced his discover-
ies in I. NEWTON, PHILOSOPHIAE NATURALIS PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA (1686). For the
collected editions of Newton's Principia, see I.B. COHEN & A. Koyxit, ISAAC NEWTON'S
PHILOSOPHIAE NATURALIS PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA (1972) [hereinafter Principia] (provid-
ing in latin all versions of Principia). See also I.B. COHEN, INTRODUCTION To NEWTON'S
'PRINCIPIA' (1971) (providing English translation of various versions of Principia, its precur-
sors and contemporaneous critiques).
2. The reader should note that Newton's classical mechanics survived a scant 200 years
of "legitimacy" before being replaced in rapid succession by Einstein's relativity, Schroed-
inger's wave mechanics, and Bohr and Heisenberg's quantum mechanics. And yet Newtonian
mechanics are still useful today. See I.B. COHEN, THE BIRTH OF A NEW PHYSICS 148 (rev.
ed. 1985). The author wishes to stress, therefore, that the Posner Rule is no more encompass-
ing than Newtonian mechanics. The Rule provides an approach to quantifying and explaining
the actual and proper use of the analytical factors involved in the field of preliminary injunc-
tions. The Rule is the best "approximation" available today for achieving truly equitable re-
sults with preliminary injunctions.
Indeed, Werner Heisenberg, one of the founders of quantum mechanics, has acknowl-
edged the logical consistency and present-day validity of Newtonian mechanics when used
within given parameters. W. HEISENBERG, ACROSS THE FRONTIERS 185 (1974). With re-
spect to Newtonian mechanics, at issue then was the degree of accuracy in results afforded a
user of classical physics or Newtonian mechanics. W. HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND PHILOSO-
PHY 96 (1958). The "good approximations" of the closed system of Newtonian mechanics
were no longer good enough for the modem theoretical physicists. Id. at 97. Newton's closed
system could not be improved. It had to be superceded and subsumed within a more accurate
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controversy regarding the proper determinants of motion.3 Third, with
his equation, Newton demonstrated a certain irreverence for the scientific
methodology of his day.4 His "Newtonian Method" forms the basis for
much of today's scientific methodology.'
Judge Richard Posner would certainly have made Sir Isaac Newton
proud were Newton alive today. Indeed, a comparison of Judge Posner's
rule for granting preliminary injunctions6 [hereinafter the "Posner
Rule"] with Newton's Second Law of Motion reveals many similarities.
In fact, it will be argued in this Article that the Posner Rule, PHp> (1-
P)Hd,7 is equally deserving of a descriptive accolade. First, like Newton,
Judge Posner has isolated the relevant determinative variables, demon-
strating succinctly and definitively the relationship among them. Sec-
approximation. Id. It is in this sense then that it could be argued that Posner, by his Rule,
supercedes and subsumes, at least for today, the historical and various "traditional" models for
granting preliminary injunctions.
3. A. KOYRf,, NEWTONIAN STUDIES 5 (1965). Again the reader should note that in
physics, as in law, the issue of indeterminacy is a very live controversy. See generally D.
BOHM, CAUSALITY AND CHANCE IN MODERN PHYSICS (1957) (critiquing quantum mechan-
ics and, in particular, the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics); E. CASSIRER,
DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM IN MODERN PHYSICS (1956) (discussing various philo-
sophical, physical and metaphysical aspects of determinism and indeterminism).
As for the law, the author, though certainly not a "Posnerian," argues in favor of greater
quantification of the variables involved in the "good approximation" that is American Juris-
prudence. For Judge Posner's views, see generally Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86
MICH. L. REv. 827 (1988); Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973). For an alternative view see Williams, Culture
and Certainty: Legal History, Theory and the Reconstructive Project, 76 VA. L. REv. 713
(1990); Williams, Critical Legal Studies. The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New
Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429 (1987).
4. See generally I.B. COHEN, THE NEWTONIAN REVOLUTION 39-154 (1980).
5. I.B. COHEN, THE REVOLUTION IN SCIENCE 175 (1985); I.B. COHEN, supra note 2, at
148.
6. See American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir.
1986).
7. Id. "P" represents the probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial,
(1-P) represents the probability that she will not prevail. "Hp" represents the harm to the
plaintiff if she is denied the injunction, "Hd" is the harm to the defendant if the plaintiff is
granted the injunction. Id.
8. See id. Posner is not the first judge to attempt quantification of the law. Judge
Learned Hand, in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., proposed the negligence formula:
B < PL, where B = the burden of precautions to avoid an accident, L = the loss, if an accident
occurs, and P = the probability of such an accident occurring absent the precautionary meth-
ods. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
Although not "universally accepted," the Hand formula has been referred to in a number
of cases. See, e.g., East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 872 (1986);
Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291, 295 (1st Cir. 1988);
Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 285
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Lange v. Schultz, 627 F.2d 122, 129 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 429 F. Supp. 830, 836 (E.D. Penn. 1977); Hall v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
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ond, although it is true that as of this moment in time he has generated
more controversy than he has stilled, one cannot deny that Judge Posner
has certainly shown an irreverence for the jurisprudential methodology
of his day. 9 Finally, admittedly, the debate over the proper standard for
granting a preliminary injunction is not as historically long-standing as
the debate over the determinants of motion. However, it will be argued
in this Article that the Posner Rule significantly narrows, if not resolves,
the preliminary injunction debate.10
Remarkably, the similarity of the resistance to these two rules and
their founders gives the greatest reason for pause. For, in the early dawn
of a new age in physical science, the intellectual resistance to Newton's
scientific approach was so great that he took an oath that he would never
again hypothesize in support of his theories.11 Today, the resistance to
the Posner Rule is well documented. 2 As was true in Newton's day, the
causes of the resistance to the Posner Rule are doubtless personal, ideo-
logical, sociological, philosophical and psychological. Yet, assuming that
the Posner Rule will ultimately achieve recognition in the history of
ideas, one wonders whether a law review "Pico-Micro Chip" in the
twenty-first century would be a more appropriate venue for such a
declaration.
What is called for, then, is an imaginative foray into twenty-first
century law. With any attempt to move forward in time, however, must
Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); cf. Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441,
1447 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986).
The Hand formula has also been referred to in a number of books and law review articles.
See, e.g., W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 85 (1987); S.
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 19 n.23 (1987); Gordon, Fair Use as
Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1609 n.57 (1982); Maurer, Common Law Defamation and the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 72 GEO. L.J. 95, 130 (1983); Posner, An Economic Theory of the Crimi-
nal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1193, 1194 n.5 (1985); Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for
Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1412 n.242 (1982).
9. See, e.g., Cohen, Posnerian Jurisprudence and Economic Analysis of Law: A View from
the Bench, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1117 (1985); Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism
About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 453 (1973).
10. The author uses the term "resolves" within the "closed system" of preliminary injunc-
tions. Certainly, in the evolution of the law a greater, more encompassing theory of equity
would quite likely supercede and subsume the Posner Rule, much as quantum mechanics
superceded and subsumed classical mechanics.
11. L. MORE, ISAAC NEWTON: A BIOGRAPHY 104-06 (1934). The recent year-long,
worldwide celebration of the 300th anniversary of the publication of Newton's Principia is
testimony to the correctness of his objective scientific method. Browne, Anniversary of a
Revolution: Newton's Principia Turns 300, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1987, at C1, col. 1.
12. See infra notes 260-300 and accompanying text (Part VI) (discussing criticisms of Pos-
ner Rule).
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come the realization that there are significant personal, ideological, socio-
logical, philosophical and psychological obstacles to overcome.
13
In entering this time warp, the reader is asked to temporarily sus-
pend her biases, be they against mathematics, or, God forbid, law and
economics research. During this brief time, this Article will explore the
past, present, and future of preliminary injunctions and the Posner Rule
in five parts. Part II presents a brief synopsis of the history of prelimi-
nary injunctions. Part III offers a statement of the Posner Rule, with a
brief discussion of relevant technical terms, the theoretical rationale un-
derlying the rule, and a list of the insights afforded by the Rule. Part IV
provides a United States Supreme Court and Court of Appeals circuit-
by-circuit analysis of preliminary injunctions and comments on each cir-
cuit court's approach (or approaches) when viewed in the light of the
Posner Rule. Part V discusses the Posner Rule Probability and Harm
Matrix, a tool which results from a manipulation of the Posner Rule and
provides a basis for demonstrating the Rule's logical consistency and uni-
versal applicability in the field of preliminary injunctions. Part VI exam-
ines actual and potential criticisms of the Posner Rule.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The tale of Lord Chief Justice Coke and Chancellor Ellesmere is a
story that first-year Civil Procedure law professors love to tell, and one
which succinctly summarizes the history of preliminary injunctions. In
fourteenth century England, the Chancery's equitable principles were
supplanting the rigidity of the common law.14 That is, the Court of
Chancery was becoming the embodiment of equitable discretion in grant-
ing exceptions to the rigid rules of pleadings and practice of the King's
Court.15 Consequently, disputes arose between the Chancellor and the
common-law judges of the King's Courts. 6
The most serious of all the King's Courts judges' allegations was
that the Chancellor was undermining "the whole law of England by sub-
13. Such travel in the figurative sense presumably would not violate the laws of relativity.
However, one may assume that such travel, whether figurative or real, is uncertain at best, and
can potentially or actually influence future events.
14. Black, A New Look at Preliminary Injunctions: Can Principles from the Past Offer Any
Guidelines to Decisionmakers in the Future?, 36 ALA. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1984).
15. Id. For a more thorough history of the victory of equity over law, and equity in gen-
eral, see 1 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459-65 (6th ed. 1938); Adams,
The Origin of English Equity, 16 CoLuM. L. REv. 87 (1916); Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere
Disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in 1616, 36 ILL. L. REV. 127 (1941).
16. Black, supra note 14, at 4.
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stituting conscience for definite rule."17 Apparently, the dispute centered
on the use of preliminary injunctions.1 8 The "definite rule" was that the
common law would remedy a wrong only after its commission. 19 Chan-
cery, however, saw no harm in preventing the wrong from occurring in
the first instance.20 The dispute over injunctive power reached its zenith
on July 26, 1616,21 when King James ruled in favor of the Chancery and
Lord Ellesmere, establishing equity as a viable tool with which courts
could dispense justice.2
At least four themes, lessons, or logical conclusions follow from the
preceding historical summary. First, although historically interesting,
the practical relevance of the historical distinction between law and eq-
uity has diminished in all federal 3 and in most state courts.2 4 Second,
the historical distinction between law and equity, as it relates to prelimi-
nary injunctions, illustrates that the tension in the law of preliminary
injunctions is ultimately one of uniform versus flexible legal standards. 25
Third, as a historical matter, the 1616 victory of equity over law has a
parallel in the modem-day victory of flexible and multiple preliminary
injunction standards over a single uniform standard.26 Fourth, it was
historically presumed, and continues to be assumed, that flexible and
multiple standards were and are incompatible with a single uniform
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See F.W. MAITLAND, EQuITy 2-10 (2d ed. 1936). Coke felt that injunctions were
against the Statutes of Praemunire and challenged the common law of the King's Courts. Id.
at 9-10.
22. ARGUMENTS Proving from ANTIQUITY the Dignity, Power, and Jurisdiction of
THE COURT of CHANCERY, 21 Eng. Rep. 576, 581-82, 588 (Ch. 1616).
23. In Shondel v. McDermott, Judge Posner railed against the historical basis for discretion
in equity, stating that "the proposition that equitable relief is 'discretionary' cannot be main-
tained today. . . ." 775 F.2d 859, 867-68 (7th Cir. 1985).
24. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 27-28 (1973).
25. The distinction between law and equity cannot assist us in formulating a standard for
granting preliminary injunctions. However, the distinction does confirm for us that the con-
troversy over the proper standard is in essence a controversy over the uniformity versus the
flexibility of legal standards.
26. See infra notes 101-77 and accompanying text (Part IV) (discdssing various circuits
and a profusion of preliminary injunction standards). Indeed, judges do not like the perceived
possible loss of discretionary power under a uniform standard. See American Hosp. Supply
Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 595 (7th Cik. 1986) (Swygert, J., dissenting). But
see Black, supra note 14, at 49. She argues for a national standard based upon the "balance of
factors." Id. Specifically, Black writes, "[fjirst, great caution should be exercised in granting a
preliminary injunction. Second, a preliminary injunction should be granted only after a find-
ing of irreparable injury." Id. See also infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text (discussing
difficulties attending "balance of factors" standard).
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standard.27
Indeed, one can find judges today who are quite concerned over the
degree to which a uniform standard infringes upon their "judicial discre-
tion" in granting preliminary injunctions. 28 In the midst of this discus-
sion of judicial power, then, the pivotal and discomfiting question arises
as to what extent the argument regarding flexibility and judicial discre-
tion reflects simply the absence or inadequacy of analyses of preliminary
injunctions. Could it be that the tension between uniformity and flexibil-
ity in the case of preliminary injunctions is merely a fictional one, merely
reflecting a misunderstanding of the modem procedural rationale for the
injunction? The Posner Rule appears to be premised on the belief that
answers to the preceding questions are possible and indeed desirable.
With his Rule, Judge Posner suggests that the appropriate and ultimately
reconciling analytical framework for understanding preliminary injunc-
tions is primarily an economic and statistical one.29
At present, no universally accepted standard for granting prelimi-
nary injunctions exists.30 Some circuit courts have suggested the con-
trary, claiming that there is a four-part standard." However, even their
"four-part" standards differ from each other. 32 Indeed, the federal
courts use two, three, four and five-step standards without any apparent
logic to their choice.33 Often those courts which seem to consistently use
the same procedure will vary the weight accorded the various factors,
rendering an accurate prediction of the court's ruling impossible.34 The
Posner Rule eliminates such uncertainties.
27. See Black, supra note 14, at 4. See also infra notes 101-77 and accompanying text
(Part IV) (demonstrating lack of rational standard for all federal courts).
28. See American Hosp., 780 F.2d at 595 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 593-94.
30. For a thorough discussion of the varying federal court standards for preliminary in-
junctions, see Wolf, Preliminary Injunctions: The Varying Standards, 7 W. NEW ENG. L.
REv. 173 (1984). See also infra notes 101-77 and accompanying text (Part IV) (providing
discussion, criticisms of federal preliminary injunction standards). The author is greatly in-
debted to Professor Wolf for his extensive survey of federal preliminary injunctions standards.
31. See, e.g., H.H. Robertson, Co. v. United States Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 387
(Fed. Cir. 1987); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs, Inc., 630 F.2d 120, 136 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980).
32. Compare Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. CL Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981) (en
banc) with Florida Medical Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 601 F.2d
199, 202-03 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1984).
33. See, e.g., H.H. Robertson, 820 F.2d at 387 (four-part model); Moteles v. University of
Penn., 730 F.2d 913, 918-19 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 855 (1984) (two-part model);
Garlock, Inc. v. United Seal, Inc., 404 F.2d 256, 257 (6th Cir. 1968) (per curiam) (three-part
model). See also infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
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III. STATEMENT, RATIONALE, AND INSIGHTS OF THE POSNER RULE
A. Statement of the Rule
Succinctly stated, the Posner Rule provides that a plaintiff should be
granted a preliminary injunction if and only if the expected loss to the
plaintiff if she is denied the injunction exceeds the expected loss to the
defendant if the injunction is granted. 35 As the ideas contained in this
Rule are well-established within economic and statistical analysis, and
since mathematical symbolism is generally a more efficient means of
communication, the Rule can be expressed mathematically as:
PHp > (1-P)Hd. 36
It is useful to consider an illustrative application of the Posner Rule.
In American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd.,3' American
Hospital Supply (AHS) sued Hospital Products alleging breach of con-
tract.3' AHS sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin Hospital Prod-
ucts from cancelling its contract with AHS. 39 The contract guaranteed
that AHS would be the only United States distributor of Hospital Prod-
ucts' goods. 4' On July 8th, the trial court ordered a preliminary injunc-
tion, enjoining Hospital Products from further action in derogation of
AHS's contractual rights.4 1 Hospital Products was also ordered to notify
AHS's dealers that AHS remained an authorized distributor of Hospital
Products' merchandise.4 2
In upholding the trial court's grant of the preliminary injunction,
35. American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir.
1986).
36. Id. Although seemingly cryptic, the mathematical formula is precisely analogous to
the verbal formulation of the Rule that is given in the text of the case. Id. See also supra note
7 for a verbal formulation of the mathematical formula's symbols. See infra notes 79, 82-84
and accompanying text for a discussion of the term "expected loss."
37. 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986).
38. Id. at 592. For a more thorough discussion of the case itself, see Note, Formulating a
Theory for Preliminary Injunctions: American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products
Ltd., 72 IowA L. REV. 1158 (1987) (supporting Posner Rule as basis for national preliminary
injunction standard).
39. American Hosp., 780 F.2d at 592.
40. Id. The supply contract between the parties had provided that American Hospital
Supply could continue to be Hospital Products' sole distributor of surgical stapling systems in
the United States, so long as the annual contract was renewed by AHS by a certain date. Id.
On the relevant date, June 3, 1985, Hospital Products requested, and AHS tendered a letter
indicating its intention to renew the contract. Id. at 595. On June 4th, however, Hospital
Products notified AHS of its intention to treat the contract as having been terminated. Id. On
June 7th, Hospital Products sent a telegram to all of AHS's dealers, notifying them that AHS
was no longer Hospital Product's authorized distributor. Id.
41. Id. at 592-93.
42. Id. at 593.
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Judge Posner announced his rule43 and applied it in three steps. The first
step involved determining the magnitude of the plaintiff's harm (Hp). 44
The second and third steps involved determining the magnitudes of the
defendant's harm (Hd),4 5 and the probability of the plaintiff's success on
the merits of the case (P), respectively. 4
In applying the first step of his Rule, Posner postulated the relevant
inquiry as a determination of (1) the plaintiff's harm; and (2) whether it
is irreparable in the given case.47 In American Hospital, the issue was not
whether AHS would have suffered lost sales because of the unavailability
of Hospital Products as a supplier.48 This "lost sales" harm, the court
said was speculative.49 Indeed, the court noted the "lost supplier" source
of the harm could have been easily eliminated by the actions available to
AHS (i.e., finding a new supplier).5 °
The real issue, the court said, turned on the nature of the harm re-
sulting from the loss of "distributor status."51 Judge Posner found that a
Hospital Products mailgram of June 7th had effectively stripped AHS of
its distributor status, and that the excess inventory held by AHS could
only be sold at a loss ranging from $10 to $30 million. 2
The second question facing the court, was whether or not that harm
was irreparable.13 AHS had purchased the excess inventory in an effort
to assist the financially distressed Hospital Products. 4 The facts of
American Hospital present one of the "classic" cases of irreparability.
Hospital Products was insolvent and close to bankruptcy;5 the ability of
the plaintiff to obtain money damages at a later date was thus highly
unlikely.5 6
43. Id. However, the basic underlying concepts of the Rule were not new. In Roland
Machinery Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., Judge Posner articulated the Rule in nonmathematical
terms. 749 F.2d 380, 386-87 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
Additionally, another scholar had independently come to similar conclusions regarding
preliminary injunctions and their dispensation. See Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary
Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1978).
44. American Hosp., 780 F.2d at 595-96.
45. Id. at 596-98.
46. Id. at 598-600.
47. Id. at 595-96.
48. Id. at 595.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 595-96.
54. Id. at 595.
55. Id. at 596.
56. Id.
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The second step in the application of the Posner Rule involves deter-
mining the magnitude of the defendant's harm.57 Judge Posner reasoned
that the source of harm to Hospital Products was the bankruptcy which
might have resulted from the award of the preliminary injunction to
AHS.58 The real harm, he said, could not have been Hospital Products'
state of bankruptcy itself, but rather the costs that go along with that
state. 9 Assuming, however, that these costs represented the quantifica-
tion of the harm to the defendant resulting from the issuance of the in-
junction, it became clear to the court that the projected likelihood that
they will accrue these costs was speculative.6° Judge Posner concluded
that the nexus between this constraint on Hospital Product's actions and
the precipitation of its bankruptcy was tenuous.61
Furthermore, the irreparability of Hd was not at issue. Judge Posner
noted that there was no issue as to whether AHS was sufficiently solvent
to' reimburse the costs incidental to Hospital Products' bankruptcy.62
Judge Posner also explained that the difficulty of measuring the harm did
not make the harm "irreparable., 63 Indeed, difficulty in measuring the
harm does not mean impossibility of measuring the harm.64
Having completed steps one and two in the application of the Pos-
ner Rule, Judge Posner proceeded to determine the value of p.65 The
primary issue in this case, he said, was whether defendant Hospital Prod-
ucts had breached the contract on June 3, 1985, or whether AHS antici-
patorily repudiated the contract.66 The district court judge concluded
57. Id. at 596-98. As was true in the discussion of Hp, there are two questions that are to
be asked about Hd: (1) what is the nature and magnitude of the defendant's harm?; (2) is that
harm irreparable? Id. at 597.
58. Id.
59. Id. Examples of these costs include the expenses of administration paid to lawyers,
accountants, etc. Id.
60. Id. at 602. The speculative nature of these costs may be explained by considering once
again the "source of harm" approach. The harm defendant Hospital Products would have
suffered from the injunction wag being contractually bound to AHS for the following year,
with up to six years in options. Id.
61. Id. at 598.
62. Id. at 596. Even if AHS were insolvent, Judge Posner observed, Hospital Products'
damages would not have been "irreparable," as AHS had posted a preliminary injunction bond
of $5 million. Id. at 598-99.
63. Id. at 597.
64. Difficulties in measurement mean that errors in measurement may result in overesti-
mation or underestimation of the harm. Once the harm is estimated, however, a dollar
amount (i.e., damages) can be calculated to offset the harm. A particular litigant's discomfort
with the risks of estimation becomes completely irrelevant if the harm, once estimated, can be
rectified by an award of damages at the end of trial.
65. Id. at 598-600.
66. Id. at 598-99.
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that Hospital Products breached the contract.6 7 After considering the
conflicting evidence, Judge Posner, writing for the appellate panel, af-
firmed the district court's conclusion issuing the injunction, holding that
the lower court's decision was not "clearly erroneous."6 "
In upholding the district court's decision to grant the preliminary
injunction, Judge Posner conducted an implicit fourth step in his applica-
tion of the Posner Rule-the mathematical substitution of the values
computed in steps one through three. Under this mathematical substitu-
tion, AHS would have been granted the preliminary injunction even if
Hospital Products' expected bankruptcy costs were as high as $11.6
million.69
B. Rationale of the Rule
1. The intuitive approach
The rationale of the Posner Rule can be explained from three differ-
ent perspectives. The first perspective is intuitive and based on the prem-
ise that the party who prevails at trial was also entitled to the award of a
preliminary injunction prior to trial. This premise reflects the implicit
argument that irreparable losses which occur during the course of trial
should not be borne by the party who ultimately prevails at trial. There
is, however, a further and more subtle argument that is implicit within
this premise. That is, as between the plaintiff and defendant, society as a
whole is indifferent as to who bears the irreparable loss which occurs
67. Id. at 600.
68. Id. Based on this ruling by the district court in the plaintiff's favor, Judge Posner
concluded that the value of P must have been "very high." Id. at 598-99.
Circuit Judge Swygert's dissent strongly attacked the court for abusing its appellate dis-
cretion by affirming the lower court. Id. at 609 (Swygert, J., dissenting). He denounced the
majority for developing what was effectively a new standard for preliminary injunctions by
using a mathematical formula for which the variables were unquantifiable. Id. (Swygert, J.,
dissenting).
69. Given the formulation of the Posner Rule, assume that the algebraic "unknown" is Hd.
In solving Hd algebraically, the values that can be substituted into the Rule are those values
most favorable to Hospital Products' case (i.e., a denial of the injunction). If, despite these
pro-Hospital Products numbers, H is unrealistically large, then an injunction can be granted
with little concern for judicial error.
First, consider the value of P. Assume that "very high" denotes a probability range of
70% to 100%. If the pro-Hospital Products value is 70%, (1-P)=30%. As for the value of
HP, AHS anticipated losses of $10-30 million. American Hosp., 780 F.2d at 595. Hospital
Products could argue, however, that AHS's real loss was $5 million, as reflected in the bond.
Id. at 598-99.
Accordingly, (.7)($5,000,000)>(.3)Hd, or Hd=$11,600,000. Hospital Products' bank-
ruptcy costs could not have totalled $11.6 million. See generally id. at 597.
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during the course of trial.7" Society does have an interest, however, in
minimizing "deadweight loss," which is defined here as preventable loss
which need not have been borne by either party.71
The Posner Rule is the only rule for granting preliminary injunc-
tions that is consistent with the premise that deadweight loss should be
minimized.72 Perhaps the most intellectually aesthetic aspect of the Pos-
ner Rule is that the Rule must logically follow once one accepts the legit-
imacy of its premise. Therefore, the only logical way to challenge the
Rule itself is to challenge the premise upon which it is founded.73
70. As is true in all litigation, the judge's ruling on the motion for injunction represents the
outcome of a zero-sum game-someone will win and someone will lose. For society as a
whole, therefore, there is a net indifference as to which litigant or litigants should bear the loss.
Society is not indifferent, however, as to the occurrence of loss which need not have been borne
by any of the litigants. Even if society's cancellation calculus does not obtain, the operation of
the Posner Rule remains quite valid. That is, if society does have a preference for a litigant
then society is not indifferent as to which litigant bears the loss from losing the lawsuit. If such
a preference exists, then that preference will be expressed as a social policy (i.e., "public inter-
est"). The judge can consider this societal preference by substituting the appropriate value for
Hp, Hd or both.
71. "Deadweight loss" is denoted in the "welfare loss" triangle of a monopolist's demand
and supply curves. See D. WATSON & M. GETz, PRICE THEORY AND ITS USES 345-46 (5th
ed. 1981). For example, assume that in a given action, the irreparable loss during the course of
the trial that can be suffered by either party is $100. Because one of these parties must win and
the other must lose at trial, the $100 loss will ultimately be borne by one of the parties. How-
ever, from a loss-prevention standpoint, society is indifferent as to which individual will ulti-
mately bear the $100 loss. Assume that the plaintiff will suffer an additional $10 in irreparable
loss during the course of trial, and that the plaintiff will certainly prevail at trial. It follows
that society has an interest in awarding plaintiff the preliminary injunction, so as to prevent the
additional $10 loss-a loss which would be prevented by the award of the injunction to the
plaintiff.
From the preceding discussion of the premise which underlies the Posner Rule, that the
party who prevails at trial is entitled to a preliminary injunction, it should be clear that there
are a number of possible rules for granting preliminary injunctions that are antithetical to the
premise. For example, a rule which dictates that the plaintiff should always be granted the
preliminary injunction is a rule which gives no consideration to the concept of deadweight loss,
since it is conceivable that the defendant, and not the plaintiff, may be the party experiencing
the deadweight loss. The preceding is a liberal application of the idea of deadweight loss. For
a readable discussion of deadweight loss, see D. WATSON & M. GETZ, supra, at 345-46.
72. See supra note 71. This assertion is supported by the following explanation: society's
concern for the $10 deadweight loss is precisely equivalent to a concern for the difference
between the expected losses of the parties (eg., $110-$100). This difference (eg., $110-100>0)
is precisely equivalent to saying that the plaintiff should be granted the preliminary injunction
if and only if its expected loss exceeds the defendant's expected loss (e.g., $1 10-100> 0 implies
$110> 100). This "expected loss" is the expected irreparable loss that will be incurred during
the course of the trial as a result of the issuance of the preliminary injunction. For an example
of an alternative rule, see supra note 71. As an exercise, the reader is invited to try to imagine
an alternative rule more consistent with the objective of minimizing deadweight loss.
73. For example, one might argue that society's concern for the minimization of loss, if
such a concern exists, is not always consistent with the vindication of parties' rights. One
could argue that implicit within the Rule is the assumption that individuals are capable of
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2. The error approach
A second perspective on the rationale of the Posner Rule involves
the argument that the objective of the Rule is to minimize judicial errors
in granting preliminary injunctions. Similar to the "intuitive approach"
discussed above,74 the argument turns on how one chooses to 'define "ju-
dicial error." An erroneously granted preliminary injunction can be de-
fined as an injunction issued to a party who did not ultimately prevail at
trial." The result under this approach is precisely equivalent to the re-
sult under the "intuitive approach," that an erroneously granted injunc-
tion generates deadweight loss.
The error approach allows one to distinguish between two possible
sources of error. The first source of potential error, occurs when a judge
chooses not to apply the Posner Rule in granting a preliminary injunc-
tion.76 The second source occurs when the Posner Rule is used but mis-
applied because of a misestimation of the Posner Rule variables. It
would seem that the number of cases in which an ultimately non-prevail-
ing party is awarded an injunction will be greater under the first source
of error than under the second.77
bearing loss equally, and even if they are not, society has no interest in seeing to it that wealth-
ier individuals bear more than their share of social loss. See supra note 70. The fact remains,
however, that the Posner Rule is logically unassailable once one accepts the legitimacy of its
premise. That is, within the "closed system" of the Posner Rule, there is logical congruity.
The author does not mean to suggest that the reader engage in no further study of preliminary
injunctions because there can be no future gains from their study. Such advice would be
equivalent to the advice which Max Planck's professor gave the great physicist, not to enter
the study of physics as it was essentially concluded. W. HEISENBERG, The End of Physics?, in
ACROSS THE FRONTIERS 184 (R. Anshen ed. 1974).
74. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
75. It should be noted that the error being discussed here is not error vis-a-vis the absolute
and unresolvable issue of whether it is the plaintiff or the defendant who should have won.
Rather, the error is defined within the very narrow context of whether the plaintiff or defend-
ant actually did win-at trial.
76. The reference here is to a judge who uses an approach with a rationale not even re-
motely close to the Posner Rule rationale. Note that a given judge's outcome, using a non-
Posner Rule approach, might result in the same outcome as that which would obtain if the
Posner Rule were used explicitly. As shown below, the Rule is very comprehensive. See infra
notes 178-259 and accompanying text (Part V). It is "positive" in the sense that it describes
what judges are doing, and it is "normative" in that it dictates to judges what they must do to
minimize judicial errors.
77. Alternately stated, the deadweight loss to society from erroneously granted injunctions
will be greater where the Posner Rule is not used than when it is used and merely misapplied.
One might argue for a third source of error, that being imperfect information. However, pau-
city of information is merely a variant of the second source of error-misestimation of Posner
Rule variables.
1228
June 1990] ON POSNER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS 1229
3. The statistical and economic approach
The third perspective is geared toward the reader who might be con-
cerned about the economic and statistical underpinnings of the Posner
Rule. A technical discussion must begin by noting that the decision to
grant a preliminary injunction is like any other statistical decision. Ac-
cordingly, the errors that have been discussed above 8 are precisely
analogous to the type I and type II errors which exist in statistical
theory.79
As applied to the Posner Rule, the relevant hypothesis is that the
difference between the expected harm to the plaintiff and the expected
harm to the defendant is greater than zero. This is simply another way
of saying that the expected harm to the plaintiff is greater than the ex-
pected harm to the defendant, or, there exists positive deadweight loss to
society which the court can avoid by issuing the injunction. Where a
judge has rejected the hypothesis as being false when it is indeed true,
then an injunction will not issue, deadweight loss will be incurred, and a
type I error will have been committed.8" Where, however, a judge ac-
cepts this hypothesis as being true when it is indeed false, then an injunc-
tion will issue and deadweight loss will once again be incurred. This is,
of course, a type II error.8"
Applied to the Posner Rule, the occurrence of the irreparable harm
to the plaintiff or defendant is contingent on the occurrence of a number
of events. Accordingly, the computation of the expected harms involves
a number of potential probabilities. The Posner Rule assumes that the
probability of winning on the merits at trial is the most significant of
78. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
79. A type I error is said to be committed where one rejects as false a hypothesis that is
indeed true. R. KIRK, ELEMENTARY STATISTICS 251 (2d ed. 1984). Similarly, a type II error
has been committed where one accepts as true a hypothesis that is indeed false. Id. This
discussion falls within the subfield of statistics called hypothesis testing. See generally L.
BUNT & A. BARTON, PROBABILITY AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING (1967); K. MILLER, HYPoTH-
ESIS TESTING WITH COMPLEX DISTRIBUTIONS (1980). With this technical approach it also
becomes possible to provide some clarification on the idea of "expected loss" as that idea is
used in the Posner Rule. A "conditional loss" is the magnitude of loss that will occur contin-
gent upon the occurrence of some event (e.g., H,, Hd). See H. BIERMAN, C. BONINI & W.
HAUSMAN, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS FOR BUSINESS DECISIONS 19-25 (4th ed. 1973). An
"expected loss" is the magnitude of loss as measured once a conditional loss is multiplied or
discounted by the probability of the occurrence of the event. Id. at 74. It should be clear that
the occurrence of any given conditional loss can be contingent on the occurrence of a number
of events. Therefore, any given discussion of expected loss includes either an implicit or ex-
plicit analysis of the relevant events and probability. See generall id. at 82-86. The terms
"expected loss" and "expected harm" are used interchangeably throughout this Article.
80. See supra note 79.
81. See supra note 79.
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those probabilities.8 2
There are at least two other probabilities relevant to the computa-
tion of the expected harm in the Posner Rule. Although not explicitly
denoted in the Posner Rule formula, but implicitly considered in Judge
Posner's analysis in American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products,
Ltd. 83 are the probability assigned to Hd, which reflected Judge Posner's
assessment of the degree of certainty that Hd would actually occur during
the course of trial, and the similar probability assigned to Hp.
84
C. Problems with Formulation of Injunction Standards
The Posner Rule affords insights into the nature of other prelimi-
nary injunction standards as those standards have been verbally formu-
lated by the courts. Under the Rule, these insights have been
recharacterized as "problems. 8 5 They represent the problems with the
verbal formulation of injunction standards, which one might expect to
find in a casual survey of the various preliminary injunction standards.
It necessarily follows that these "problems" exist only insofar as they are
deemed to exist by dint of the Posner Rule.
82. The rationale underlying this assumption is to minimize net loss or "deadweight loss."
See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. Since it cannot be known with certainty which
party will prevail at the end of a trial, it becomes necessary to weigh the losses being alleged by
each party by a probability which reflects the state of knowledge about the parties' chances of
success at trial. Because someone will win at trial and someone will lose, the probability of the
simultaneous occurrence of these two events must be equal to one.
83. 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986).
84. Regardless of the outcome of the judge's decision, what is the "naked" probability that
the plaintiff or the defendant would experience the loss at issue? Unlike the probability of
success at trial, the sum of these two probabilities need not equal one. The occurrence of the
irreparable harm to be experienced by the plaintiff or the defendant during the course of trial
are events that are more independent than dependent. Of course, the designation of the Posner
Rule harms as "expected harms" remains, despite the fact that a second, additional, but differ-
ent kind of probability should be used to compute the final expected harm magnitudes. Let the
occurrence probabilities be denoted by Pp and Pd, and the Posner Rule could now be written as
(P)(Pp)(HP)>(l-P)(Pd)(Hd). Allowing P*=(P)(Pp) and P**=(I-P)(Pd), the magnitudes
(P*)(Hp) and (P**)(Hd) would still be considered "expected harms." See also infra note 300.
For a discussion of the probability "multiplication rule," see E. MANSFIELD, STATISTICS FOR
BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 86-87 (2d ed. 1983).
Much technical material remains to be discussed about the Posner Rule. These topics,
however, although of fundamental importance, are not of immediate relevance to the objec-
tives to be achieved by this Article. First, there is the issue and the controversy as to whether
or not a judge engages in the estimation of subjective probabilities. The Posner Rule assumes
that a judge does indeed engage in such estimation. Second, there is the broader analytical
framework within which the Posner Rule fits. A judge can be said to be a supplier of, and
litigants are demanders of "errorless judicial decisions." In this context, it is possible to define
price and quantity terms as is customarily done in supply and demand analysis. For an even
more esoteric discussion one might, economically-speaking, "enter the judge's mind."
85. These have been denominated "problems" only for purposes of this essay.
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1. Factor relationship problem
This problem refers to the fact that many preliminary injunction
standards consist simply of a list of two, three, four or five "factors" that
are "to be considered" in granting the preliminary injunction.86 Like any
other legal analysis based upon a "list of factors," one is led to wonder
why the factors proffered should have more relevance than any other list
of factors. The intellectual defensibility of a particular list of factors be-
comes problematic where the factors listed have earned their places on
the list through legal tradition. As discussed in the historical synopsis at
the outset of this Article,8 7 the historical rationale for the preliminary
injunction has very little to do with its modem procedural rationale.
Yet, even where the factors are related to the modem procedural
rationale for preliminary injunctions, a mere listing of these factors leaves
one in a quandary as to how these factors are related. Indeed, questions
abound: Are these the most crucial, determinative factors? Are all of the
factors of equal importance? .Must they all be met? How should they be
met? It should be apparent to the reader that the Posner Rule and the
resultant Matrix8 8 rectify this problem by demonstrating precisely and
succinctly the manner in which preliminary injunction "factors" are
related.
2. Probability differentiation problem
As previously discussed, 89 a multitude of probabilities could be used
to compute the expected harm in the Posner Rule. When one is without
the aid of a rationale as to why a particular probability should be used,
the problem of differentiating among possible probabilities becomes
pressing. For example, when a preliminary injunction standard requires
only some probability of success on the merits, it is not at all clear what
is to be done with the other probabilities relevant to the granting of the
injunction."
The Posner Rule minimizes the possibility of this confusion by mak-
ing a distinction between the probability of success on the merits and the
other probabilities that might be used in the computation of the expected
86. See infra notes 101-77 and accompanying text (Part IV) (providing discussion of vari-
ous tests).
87. See supra notes 14-34 and accompanying text (Part II).
88. See infra notes 178-259 and accompanying text (Part V).
89. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
90. Indeed, since the standards may fail to mention or distinguish the merit probability
from other relevant preliminary injunction probabilities, it is quite possible to confuse these
other probabilities as being the probability of success on the merits, when in reality the others
are not.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
harms to the parties.91
3. Probability gradation problem
Another potential problem related to the use of probabilities within
preliminary injunction standards is the probability gradation problem-
assigning numerical values to verbal statements of probability levels.
This problem can manifest itself in many different ways. For example,
the statement that a litigant has "no probability of success on the merits"
cannot be taken literally to mean that the probability of success is equal
to zero. At the same time, a standard which requires the showing of
"some probability of success on the merits" is somewhat unclear. The
magnitude of "some" can range from a probability of one percent to
ninety-nine percent. As discussed in American Hospital Supply Corp. v.
Hospital Products, Ltd.,92 one possible solution to the probability grada-
tion problem is to assign numerical values to the probability or to specify
a range of values within which a probability falls.
4. Definition-of-harm problem
This problem has two basic manifestations. The first involves the
determination of the "irreparability" of the harm. As discussed above,93
the Posner Rule suggests that there be only one test-whether or not the
harm can be "repaired" by the award of damages at trial. This definition
of irreparability is consistent with the idea that the purpose of the injunc-
tion is to minimize deadweight loss. Clearly, the concern for this loss
would not be as great were that loss ameliorable by the award of dam-
ages. This definition of irreparability is narrow.
The other difficulty involves a failure to make a distinction between
the absolute and the expected harm to the parties. A failure to attach a
probability to the harms alleged by the parties in the preliminary injunc-
tion hearing implies that the harms are being treated as absolute harms,
or harms that are certain to occur. Such an assumption on the part of
the court greatly distorts the preliminary injunction decision that is ren-
dered, since rarely is it absolutely true that the prospective harm alleged
by the parties will occur.
94
91. See American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir.
1986). Also, the Posner Rule makes it clear that a relationship exists between the probabilities
of success for the plaintiffs and defendant (Le, P and (I-P)). See id.
92. 780 F.2d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 1986). See also supra note 69 (providing example of as-
signing numerical values).
93. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
94. Judge Posner rectified this problem by assigning a specific probability (e.g., Pp, Pd) to
the harm alleged by the parties. American Hosp., 780 F.2d at 593.
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5. Aphorism problem
This category of problems is a catch-all category dealing with the
preliminary injunction aphorisms that are often used by the courts. 95
These aphorisms are extant in the current law only by virtue of historical
accident. One example is that a preliminary injunction should be granted
to "preserve the status quo." 96 Such a declaration is fraught with ques-
tions: Whose-status quo and why should the status quo be preserved? 97
The insurmountable problem with these legal aphorisms is that they
reverse the process of logical analysis. The proponent of one of these
aphorisms is put in the awkward position of attempting to intellectually
justify the aphorism without an antecedent analysis of why it is that pre-
liminary injunctions exist. Such intellectual freewheeling leads to a
number of problems, the most visible of which is massive confusion as to
the "right" justification for the aphorism. The Posner Rule alleviates
these difficulties by beginning with an analysis of the rationale underlying
the preliminary injunction, and then following with a rule which reflects
this analysis.98
The next portion of this Article discusses the preliminary injunction
standards announced by the United States Supreme Court and the fed-
eral courts of appeals. Specifically, an attempt is made to identify which
of the preceding five problems99 can be found within a given court. The
intent here is to be comprehensive, but not encyclopedic. Given the mea-
sure of repetition from circuit to circuit, the reader is urged to focus
simply on the circuits of interest. I°°
IV. APPLICATION: PROBLEMS WITH FORMULATION OF STANDARDS
IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND COURTS OF
APPEALS
A. The United States Supreme Court
Much of the responsibility for the existing variations in preliminary
injunction standards lies with the United States Supreme Court. At least
95. See, eg., Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 634 F.2d
1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1980).
96. Id. (citations omitted).
97. See D. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 403-05 (1st ed. 1985).
98. See infra text accompanying notes 178-2j9 (Part V) (providing Posner Rule
Probability of Harm Matrix and case analysis).
99. See supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
100. Many of the cases cited in this portion of the essay came to this author's attention
because they were cited in Wolf, supra note 30. The author is once again quite grateful to
Professor Wolf for his able analysis.
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one commentator has suggested that the Court has been "inattentive,"
addressing the standards "casually and with little regard for the varying
standards followed by the lower Federal courts." 101 This observation is
validated by considering some of the "problems" manifested by recent
injunction standards used and formulated by the Court.
Both the probability differentiation 02 and the probability gradation
problem 03 are illustrated in the case of Amoco Production Co. v. Village
of Gambell.l° In that case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had af-
firmed a preliminary injunction of all activities connected with oil and
gas leases that the Secretary of the Interior had awarded various oil com-
panies.105 In reversing the preliminary injunction, the Supreme Court
stated that the lower court should not have issued an injunction because
the injury to the environment was not "probable" (i.e., no indication of
probability gradation and probability differentiation problems).106
Other Supreme Court cases illustrate the probability gradation prob-
lem. For example, the Amoco Court's reference to the "likelihood," as
opposed to the "possibility" of success on the merits, was an attempt to
approximate various probability magnitudes with verbal formulations. 107
101. Wolf, supra note 30, at 174.
102. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
104. 107 S. Ct. 1396 (1987).
105. Id. at 1402.
106. Id. at 1404. Specifically, the Court stated:
Environmental injury by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money
damages and is often permanent or at least of a long duration, i.e., irreparable. If
such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore, the balance of harms will usually favor the
issuance of an injunction to protect the environment. Here, however, injury to sub-
sistence resources from exploration was not at all probable. And on the other side of
the balance of harms was the fact that the oil company petitioners had committed
approximately $70 million to exploration to be conducted during the summer of 1985
which they would have lost without chance of recovery had exploration been
enjoined.
Id
The Court was certainly correct in denoting environmental injury as irreparable. Envi-
ronmental injury, like bankruptcy, represents a classic case of irreparable injury. Notwith-
standing this, the "probability differentiation problem" in the decision is glaring. What exactly
did the Court mean by "probable?" Was this a reference to the probability of success on the
merits, or the probability that the event would actually occur, or some other probability? In
addition to this problem, the incidence of the "probability gradation problem" must also be
noted in the preceding passage. That is, it is clear that the reference to $70 million is a refer-
ence to that amount as an absolute number, a cost that would occur with certainty. The
assignment of an implicit probability of 1 to an uncertain magnitude, often leads to an errone-
ous decision.
107. See, eg., Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 441
(1974) (citing Stark v. New York Stock Exch., 466 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1972)) (providing likeli-
hood test); Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 456 (1973) (providing possibility test). For a more
thorough discussion, see Wolf, supra note 30, at 182-83.
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The difficulty, of course, is that these various verbal formulations give no
indication whatsoever as to the relevant underlying probability magni-
tudes. A simpler and clearer analytical system would be one in which
various probability magnitudes were consistently equated with certain
verbal formulations. In addition to the probability gradation problem,
Supreme Court cases reveal indications of the "factor relationship
problem." 108
B. The Circuit Courts of Appeals
1. The District of Columbia Circuit
The factor relationship problem is also present in preliminary in-
junction cases decided by the District of Columbia Circuit. Although the
four-factor standard of Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v, Federal
Power Commission 109 is often cited by the court,'1° the three-factor stan-
dard of Perry v. Perry 1I has never been expressly overruled by the Court.
Moreover, it might be argued that this circuit employs a five-factor stan-
dard since in Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis 112 the court considered the inade-
quacy of legal remedy as a factor separate from the irreparable injury
factor. 1 3 In short, the circuit's movement from three to four to five fac-
tors signals a fundamental confusion as to what the relevant factors are
for granting preliminary injunctions. 
114
108. Specifically, in the absence of an analytical framework, the Court has been hard-
pressed to determine what "factors" are relevant to a standard for granting preliminary injunc-
tions. For example, over the past two decades, the Court has announced a two-factor, three-
factor, and four-factor standard with no indication of how these standards could be reconciled.
See, eg., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931-34 (1975) (applying three-factor test);
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83-84 n.53 (1974) (applying four-factor test); Brown v.
Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 456 (1973) (applying two-factor test). See also Wolf, supra note 30, at
182-83.
109. 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per curiam). Jobbers elucidated the District of Colum-
bia Circuit's four-factor test for issuing a preliminary injunction. A plaintiff must: (1) make a
strong showing of likely success on the merits; (2) demonstrate irreparable injury in the case
and the inadequacy of a remedy at law; (3) provide that other parties are not substantially
harmed by the injunction; and (4) show that the "public interest" is not adversely affected. Id.
at 925.
110. See, e.g., Murray v. Kunzig, 462 F.2d 871, 877-78 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Democratic Cent.
Comm. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n, 436 F.2d 233, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Armour & Co. v. Freeman, 304 F.2d 404, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
111. 190 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1951). Perry states that the determinative factors are: (1) the
probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury; and (3) balancing of harm to the
parties involved. Id. at 602.
112. 672 F.2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
113. Id. at 970.
114. It is also possible to find preliminary injunction cases in this circuit that demonstrate
an interesting variation on the "probability gradation problem." In Washington Metro. Area
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2. The Federal Circuit
The statutory jurisdiction of this circuit is primarily limited to ap-
peals from Article I courts,115 federal agencies, and patent cases from
any United States district court.1 16 As such, the court's standard for re-
viewing grants and denials of preliminary injunctions is dependent upon
the circuit from which the case originated. 17 However, the court claims
to follow a traditional four-factor test.1 8 This circuit thus suffers from
the same factor indecisiveness as the Third Circuit, whose "traditional"
standard it has adopted. 1 9
Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., the court argued that the four-factor standard of Job-
bers could be viewed as a flexible standard. 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Specifically,
the court stated that the more the first three equity factors "favored" the plaintiff, the less of a
showing was required on the likelihood of success on the merits. Id. Indeed, the court stated
that the plaintiff did not have to show a mathematical probability of success on the merits. Id.
Questions arise. Are there probabilities known to intellectual history that are not mathemati-
cal probabilities? Assuming then that the court misspoke on this issue, is it reasonable to
further assume from the court's statement that it is possible for the plaintiff to be awarded an
injunction with a non-existent mathematical probability (i.e., a probability of success of zero)?
Such a position would imply an expected harm of zero. Based upon that standard, the plain-
tiffs could never be awarded a preliminary injunction.
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. Such courts include the Court of International Trade, 28
U.S.C. §§ 251(a), 1292(d)(1) (1982), and the Tax Court, 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1982).
116. The Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction is limited. It can hear appeals from the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987),
certain findings by the Secretary of Commerce, id. § 1295(a)(7), the Merit Systems Protection
Board, id § 1295(a)(9), and any agency board of contract appeals. Id. § 1295(a)(l0).
117. In Atari, Inc v. JS & A Group, Inc., the court held that it would follow the law of the
circuit from which the case was transferred. 747 F.2d 1422, 1439-40 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See
also, e.g., Xeta, Inc. v. Atex, Inc., 852 F.2d 1280, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (applying First Cir-
cuit's preliminary injunction test); Pretty Punch Shoppettes, Inc. v. Hauk, 844 F.2d 782, 783
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (applying Eighth Circuit's four-factor test); Power Controls Corp. v.
Hybrinetics, Inc. 806 F.2d 234, 237 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (applying Ninth Circuit test).
118. In H.H. Robertson, Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384 (Fed. Cir. 1987), the
court found that the standard four-factor test enunciated by the Third Circuit in Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 630 F.2d 120, 136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014
(1980), was "substantially the same standard enunciated" by the Federal Circuit. HH. Rob-
ertson, 820 F.2d at 387 (citing Roper Corp. v. Litton Sys., 757 F.2d 1266, 1270-73 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Chems., 773 F.2d 1230, 1231-34 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). That test
is:
(1) a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation and (2) that the mo-
vant will be irreparably injured pendente lite if relief is not granted .... Moreover,
while the burden rests upon the moving party to make these two requisite showings,
the district court "should take into account, when they are relevant, (3) the possibil-
ity of harm to other interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and
(4) the public interest."
H.H. Robertson, Co., 820 F.2d at 387 (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc.,
630 F.2d 120, 136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980)).
119. See infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of Third Circuit
standards.
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3. The First Circuit
An interesting variant of the factor relationship problem is the "slid-
ing scale" standard of granting preliminary injunctions, which has been
adopted by the First Circuit. 120 The idea which seems to underlie the
sliding scale standard is that an inverse relationship exists between the
probability of success on the merits and the irreparable injury to the
plaintiff. The reader will note, however, that the sliding scale idea is sim-
ply an application of the expected loss concept discussed above. 121 For
example, in order to achieve an expected loss of $10, one can multiply an
absolute magnitude of $100 by a probability of .1, or an absolute magni-
tude of $20 by a probability of .5, and so on. This illustrates that the
probability and absolute magnitude are inversely related and are, in this
sense, a sliding scale. Contrast this with the idea of expected loss as it is
used by the Posner Rule. 122
4. The Second Circuit
The famous "alternative grounds" preliminary injunction standard
of the Second Circuit presents an interesting twist on the "factor rela-
120. See Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1009 (1st Cir. 1981); ac-
cord Massachusetts Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities v. Civilian Defense Agency, 649
F.2d 71, 74-75 (Ist Cir. 1981). First Circuit preliminary injunction case law contains a number
of the preliminary injunction "problems" discussed supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
For example, the "aphorism problem" is illustrated in the case of International Association of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 826 F.2d 1141 (Ist Cir. 1987). In
that case, the court indicated that a preliminary injunction should "maintain the status quo."
Id. at 1151.
Illustrations of the "factor relationship problem" can also be founa in the First Circuit
where it is not completely clear whether the standard in the First Circuit involves two, three or
four "factors." The four-factor standard of Belotti, 641 F.2d at 1009, is often cited by the
court. See, e.g., Cohen v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 647 F.2d 209, 211 (1st Cir. 1981);
Auburn News Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273, 277 (Ist Cir. 1981). However, the
court has on occasion reverted to a two-factor standard. See, e.g., Maceira v. Pagan, 649 F.2d
8, 15 (1st Cir. 1981). The court has also applied a three-factor standard. See Rushia v. Town
of Ashburnham, 701 F.2d 7, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1983); National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke,
608 F.2d 819, 823-25 (1st Cir. 1979).
121. See supra notes 79, 82 and accompanying text.
122. In contrast to the sliding scale approach, the expected loss concept clarifies the nature
of the relationship between the irreparable harm and the probability of success on the merits.
The expected loss concept demonstrates that these two factors are inextricably intertwined.
Once it is clear that the sliding scale idea is merely an application of the expected loss concept,
the sliding scale idea loses some of its intellectual novelty and rigor. It naturally follows from
the expected loss concept that there are an infinite number of arithmetical ways to generate a
single expected loss. The Posner Rule, therefore, permits the emphasis to be placed where it
should be: given the magnitude of plaintiff's expected loss, how does that magnitude compare
to the magnitude of defendant's expected loss?
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tionship problem." 123 In the Second Circuit, a plaintiff seeking a prelimi-
nary injunction must show irreparable injury, and either a likelihood of
success on the merits or a "serious question" which goes to the merits.1
24
The Second Circuit also requires that a plaintiff show that the balance of
hardship tips in her favor. 125 Perhaps the most obvious difficulty with
this standard is that literally an infinite number of "factors" are sub-
sumed within a "serious question." It becomes rather difficult for anyone
to form a reasonable expectation as to what will constitute a serious ques-
tion in the eyes of the judges in the Second Circuit. One can imagine that
cries of the meting out of justice according to the length of the "chancel-
lor's foot" are not too distant from the administration of such a
standard. 
126
5. The Third Circuit
The preliminary injunction problems of the Third Circuit are not
significantly different from the problems of other circuits. The factor re-
lationship problem is present: like most circuits, the Third Circuit is un-
able to decide whether it wants a two- or four-factor standard. 127 In
some cases, it seems the Third Circuit has been unable to decide whether
123. See Wolf, supra note 30, at 192-96 for a discussion of historical development of the
"alternative grounds" standard.
124. Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
125. Id.
126. However, the Second Circuit's standard may arguably be a single standard, not a stan-
dard based on "alternative grounds." Specifically, the alternative ground in the Second Cir-
cuit's standard suggests only that a plaintiff could possibly be awarded a preliminary
injunction even when the probability of success on the merits is less than likely, or less than
50%. The plaintiff can still have a large expected loss even when the probability of success on
the merits is less than 50% (!ea, Hp is large, while P is less than 50%).
Jack Kahn Music Co. v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co. presents an interesting variation on
the "probability gradation problem." 604 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1979). Specifically, the Second
Circuit held that lower courts should address the issue of irreparable injury first, since that
issue must be addressed ultimately under either ground of the Second Circuit's standard. Id.
at 758-59. The Posner Rule suggests that since both the irreparable injury and the probability
of success are used in computing the plaintiff's expected loss, the number that is generated first
is irrelevant to the ultimate computation of that expected loss. Ultimately, the instruction by
the Second Circuit to the lower courts does not merge with the reality of the courtroom. If the
plaintiff's probability of success on the merits is truly equal to zero, then the trial judge is
unlikely to waste judicial time in addressing the issue of whether or not the plaintiff's injuries
are irreparable. Such an approach is perfectly consistent with the dictates of the Posner Rule.
127. See, eg., Allegheny County Sanitary Auth. v. EPA, 732 F.2d 1167, 1177 (3d Cir.
1984) (applying four-factor test); Moteles v. University of Penn., 730 F.2d 913, 918-19 (3d
Cir.) (applying two-factor test), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 855 (1984). For a detailed discussion of
the Third Circuit's groping for a preliminary injunction standard, see Wolf, supra note 30, at
196-200.
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it should have a standard at all.
128
Furthermore, judges in the Third Circuit are given the option of
using the "sliding scale" in ruling on preliminary injunctions. 129 Once
again, this idea of a sliding scale likely reflects the court's misunderstand-
ing of the relationship between the probability of success on the merits
and the irreparable harm. Additionally, the court's exclusive focus on
this sliding scale suggests that the plaintiff's harm has abstract signi-
cance. Such a myopic view misses the point that the plaintiff's harm h~s
significance only in relationship to thb defendant's harm.
6. The Fourth Circuit
When considered from the perspective of the Posner Rule, the pre-
liminary injunction case law in the Fourth Circuit exhibits few problems.
In an early and seminal preliminary injunction case, Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Midland Oil Co.,130 the court stated that the balance of hardships
had to favor the movant if she were to be granted a preliminary injunc-
tion.' 3 ' Forty years later, the court refined its test into a form that is
almost precisely equivalent to the Posner Rule. In West Virginia High-
lands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co.,132 the court indicated that a
preliminary injunction could be granted only if the injury to the movant
without the injunction outweighed the injury to the opponent were the
injunction granted.' 33 This formulation differs from that of the Posner
Rule insofar as it does not make an explicit reference to the idea of ex-
pected harm.
Even though the Fourth Circuit's standard reflects a "factor rela-
tionship problem," the Fourth Circuit has continued to make encourag-
ing refinements of its preliminary injunction standard.134 Indeed, the
court recently referred to the probability of success on the merits as the
appropiate probability to be used in computing the expected harm of the
parties.
135
128. See Wolf, supra note 30, at 196-200.
129. See, eg., Eli Lilly, 630 F.2d at 136.
130. 55 F.2d 42 (4th Cir. 1932).
131. Id. at 45-46.
132. 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971).
133. Id. at 235-36. Additionally, the court added the "public interest" factor to its determi-
nation. Id. at 236.
134. See, e.g., Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 194-95 (4th Cir.
1977).
135. Id. at 195. In Blackwelder Furniture Co., the court stated that the preliminary injunc-
tion movant did not have to show a likelihood of success on the merits where the balance of
hardships tipped in her favor. Id. The court implied that where the balance of hardships did
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7. The Fifth Circuit
Although the Fifth Circuit has indicated a four-factor standard, the
court has suggested that additional factors may be considered by the trial
judge as needed. 136 Such an ad hoc approach to the formulation of pre-
liminary injunction standards suggests the existence of a grave case of the
"factor relationship problem." The factor relationship problem is also
apparent in the Fifth Circuit's use of the "sliding scale" concept. 137 Ad-
ditionally, the "aphorism" problem is present in the Fifth Circuit. The
court has suggested that the historical distinction between affirmative
and negative injunctions may provide a basis on which to grant or deny a
preliminary injunction.
1 38
However, some cases within the Fifth Circuit are in complete accord
with the Posner Rule. For example, in Texas v. Seatrain International,
S.A.,139 the court held that an injunction could not issue where the mo-
vant had "no chance" of success on the merits regardless of the relative
hardships associated with the injunction."4
8. The Sixth Circuit
The factor relationship problem appears to be particularly pro-
nounced in the Sixth Circuit. Not only are there two-, 14 1 three- 142 and
not tip in the movant's favor, then a greater showing of likely success on the merits had to be
made. Id.
The reader can easily demonstrate that the two preceding statements are correct per the
Posner Rule. This is not to suggest that preliminary injunctions in the Fourth Circuit are
completely without difficulty: there is some indication that the court continues to believe that
preliminary injunctions are necessary to preserve the status quo. See United States ex rel.
Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Singer Co., 889 F.2d 1327, 1335 (4th Cir. 1989); Feller v. Brock,
802 F.2d 722, 727 (4th Cir. 1986); Federal Leasing, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 650 F.2d
495, 499 (4th Cir. 1981). This, of course, is a classic manifestation of an "aphorism problem"
discussed supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
136. Florida Medical Ass'n v. United States Dept. of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 601 F.2d
199, 203 n.2 (5th Cir. 1984) (authorizing use of additional factors); Canal Authority v. Cal-
laway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating four-factor standard).
137. See, e.g., Canal.Authority, 489 F.2d at 576. For a greater discussion of the Fifth Cir-
cuit's use of the sliding scale approach, see Wolf, supra note 30, at 206-07.
138. Compact Van Equip. Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 566 F.2d 952, 954 (5th Cir. 1978).
139. 518 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1975).
140. Id. at 180 (emphasis in original). If the court had not literally referred to a probability
of zero, then its stitement would not accord with the Posner Rule. It is possible to have a
large expected loss even when a probability value is small. See infra notes 183-201 and accom-
panying text.
141. American Fed'n of Musicians v. Stein, 213 F.2d 679, 683 (6th Cir.), cert. dented, 348
U.S. 873 (1954).
142. Garlock, Inc. v. United Seal, Inc., 404 F.2d 256, 257 (6th Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
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four-factor 143 standards, but the court seems to have suggested that the
appropriateness of these standards depends upon the nature of the
case. 1  More interesting perhaps is the fact that the court has denied the
existence of this "alternative test approach" while not explicitly overrul-
ing any particular standard.14 This situation is aggravated by the
court's 'suggestion that its factors are not comprehensive.
146
9. The Seventh Circuit
It seems almost axiomatic that a prophet, be he Posner or Newton,
is not (initially, at least) welcome in his own land. The law of prelimi-
nary injunctions in the Seventh Circuit offers no exception to that axiom.
The mathematical formula announced by Judge Posner in Roland Ma-
chinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc. 147 and American Hospital Supply
Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd.148 has received a mixed reception. 149
143. North Avondale Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth., 464 F.2d 486,
488 (6th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
144. This is clearly demonstrated in Wolf's analysis of the Sixth Circuit. See Wolf, supra
note 30, at 208-12.
145. Warner v. Central Trust Co., 715 F.2d 1121, 1123-24 (6th Cir. 1982).
146. Tate v. Frey, 735 F.2d 986, 990 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). There is an interesting
aspect of the Sixth Circuit's four-factor standard, which must be commented upon here. In
North Avondale, one of the four factors listed by the court was a "strong showing" of the
probability of success on the merits. North Avondale, 464 F.2d at 488. The Posner Rule af-
fords the insight that even where such a strong showing has been made, the awarding of a
preliminary injunction may not be warranted.
In terms of the formula, even where P is extremely high, a value of Hp that is extremely
small implies that the expected harm to the plaintiff is small. Where the harm to the defend-
ant, Hd is extremely large, despite the small size of (I - P), then the expected harm to the
defendant may still be quite large. This combination of circumstances implies that the plaintiff
will be denied the injunction despite her "strong showing" of the probability of success.
147. 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
148. 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986).
149. Though a number of Seventh Circuit cases cite American Hospital, few have actually
applied the Posner Rule. The cases can be separated into three categories: those following the
Rule-Haan Crafts Corp. v. Craft Masters, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1234, 1244 (N.D. Ind. 1988);
DiDomenico v. Employers Coop. Indus. Trust, 676 F. Supp. 903, 907 (N.D. Ind. 1987); Sa-
muel Bingham Co. v. Maron, 651 F. Supp. 102, 107 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Lesko v. Bowen, 639 F.
Supp. 1152, 1156-57 (E.D. Wis. 1986); Interpoint Corp. v. Truck World, Inc., 656 F. Supp.
114, 116 (N.D. Ind. 1986); Midcon Corp. v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1475, 1479
(N.D. Ill. 1986); Dillingham Constr. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 629 F. Supp. 406,
408 (E.D. Wis. 1986); Nagy v. Custom Hoists, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 675, 678 (E.D. Wis. 1986);
those following Roland Machinery's five part standard-Hendricks Music Co. v. Steinway,
Inc., 689 F. Supp. 1501, 1513 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (using "sliding scale" approech); Robertson v.
Granite City Community Unit School Dist. No. 9, 684 F. Supp. 1002, 1004-05 (S.D. Ill. 1988);
Jones v. Bowman, 664 F. Supp. 433, 436-37 (N.D. Ind. 1987); Stove, Furnace & Appliance v.
Weyerhauser Paper Co., 650 F. Supp. 431,433-34 (S.D. Ill. 1988); Means Servs., Inc. v. Rental
Uniform Servs., 639 F. Supp. 208, 213 (C.D. Ill. 1986); and those following the "traditional"
Seventh Circuit four-part standard-Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d
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Some of the criticisms leveled at the Rule are discussed further in later
sections of this Article. 150 For now, however, it is worthwhile to con-
sider the merits of the post-Posner Rule assertion that "it should be obvi-
ous . . . that concerns about the continuing validity of the traditional
approach to preliminary injunctive relief in this circuit are misplaced,"
and that "[ihe law remains unchanged."151 Also in response to the Pos-
ner Rule, Judge Will has observed that if the "traditional standards 'ain't
broke,'" they should not be fixed.
15 2
The preceding discussion illustrates that in seven circuits and the
Supreme Court, the so-called "traditional standard" is very broke. Fur-
thermore, to the assertion that the "law remains unchanged," comes the
necessary rebuttal: what law? We know that a changefrom a prior state
of the world has occurred only if we know what that prior state of the
world was. The state of disarray of the world of preliminary injunction
case law in the Seventh Circuit was well documented in the Roland Ma-
chinery opinion.
15 3
Indeed, the "traditional approach" of the Seventh Circuit resembles
very much the traditional approach in any other circuit.15 4 Clearly, the
"factor relationship problem" is present. The court's simple listing of the
four "factors" 151 gives a practitioner no idea of how these factors are
related. Certainly, the "probability gradation problem" is present as
well. In attempting to establish a probability of success on the merits, a
movant has no idea whether the level of proof required is "some," "rea-
sonable," or "at least a reasonable" level.156 Finally, the "sliding scale"
in the Seventh Circuit has many of the same problems as the sliding scale
1176, 1181 (7th Cir. 1989); Gould v. Lambert Excavating, Inc., 870 F.2d 1214, 1217 (7th Cir.
1989); Naked City, Inc. v. Aregood, 667 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (N.D. Ind. 1987); Illinois Psy-
chological Ass'n v. Falk, 638 F. Supp. 876, 880-83 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v.
CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 406, 408 (N.D. Ill 1986); Laidlaw Acquisition Corp. v. Mayflower
Group, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 1513, 1517 (S.D. Ind. 1986); Beermart, Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co.,
633 F. Supp. 1089, 1104 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (using sliding scale approach).
150. See infra notes 260-300 and accompanying text (Part VI).
151. Frisby v. Schultz, 807 F.2d 1339, 1343 (7th Cir. 1986).
152. Ball Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1347 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Will, J., concurring).
153. Roland Machinery, 749 F.2d at 382.
154. See, eg., H.H. Robertson, 820 F.2d at 387.
155. Fox Valley Harvestore v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods. Inc., 545 F.2d 1096, 1097 (7th
Cir. 1976). The "traditional" four-factor test of the Seventh Circuit is as follows: (1) the
plaintiff must have no adequate remedy at law and will be irreparably harmed; (2) the injury to
the plaintiffwill outweigh the injury to the defendant if the injunction is granted; (3) the plain-
tiff has at least a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; and, (4) granting the prelimi-
nary injunction will serve the public interest. Id.
156. Wolf, supra note 30, at 214-15.
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in other circuits. 1 "
10. The Eighth Circuit
Examination of the preliminary injunction case law in the Eighth
Circuit presents a serious case of the "factor relationship problem," while
simultaneously illustrating the logic behind the Posner Rule. In
Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. CL. Systems, Inc.,158 the Eighth Circuit met
en banc in order to resolve the confusion over the proper preliminary
injunction standard in the circuit. Prior to Dataphase, the standards in
the circuit included a two-factor standard, 159 a two-factor with two addi-
tional optional factors, 1"° and an "alternative test" standard. 61
Although the court in Dataphase recited a four-factor standard, 162 it
is not at all clear that it achieved its objective of alleviating the confusion
in the circuit. Indeed, the concurring opinion in Dataphase suggested
that the court had succeeded only in supplanting its two "alternative
test[s]" with a third test.163 Dataphase dictum added to the confusion by
stating "[i]n balancing the equities no single factor is determinative.""
The Posner Rule suggests that such a position is simply erroneous.
Where P has a value of zero, the movant should not be awarded the
preliminary injunction. Therefore, it is possible for a single "factor" to
be determinative.
11. The Ninth Circuit
There is very little that is unique about the preliminary injunction
standards in the Ninth Circuit. Indeed, the "factor relationship prob-
lem" is present in the Ninth Circuit's decisions. Specifically, at least
three different standards are presently in use in the Ninth Circuit: the
"continuum" standard;165 the "traditional" standard; 166 and the "alter-
157. See Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 123 (7th Cir.
1982) (enunciating sliding scale approach). For a discussion of the problems with this ap-
proach, see supra notes 120-22, 129 and accompanying text.
158. 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981) (en bane).
159. City of Newton v. Levis, 79 F. 715, 718 (8th Cir. 1897).
160. Minnesota Bearing Co. v. White Motor Corp., 470 F.2d 1323, 1326 (8th Cir. 1973).
161. Fennell v. Butler, 570 F.2d 263, 264 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 906 (1978).
162. Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 114.
163. Id. at 115 (Ross, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 113. But see Roberts v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 731 F.2d 523, 526 (8th Cir.
1984) (failure to show irreparable injury is fatal to injunction).
165. Benda v. Grand Lodge, 584 F.2d 308, 315 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 937
(1978) (two prongs of test were extremes of single continuum and not separate standards).
166. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86, 87 (9th
Cir. 1975).
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native test" standard.167 One could probably find that different panels in
the Ninth Circuit are applying different standards. Additionally, the
Ninth Circuit has asserted that "[a]lthough it sometimes appears that
there are two separate tests for the grant of a preliminary injunction, in
fact there is only one, best described as a continuum in which the re-
quired showing of harm varies inversely with the required showing of
meritoriousness. 168
12. The Tenth Circuit
The "factor relationship problem" is present in the Tenth Circuit.
At least four different preliminary injunction standards are currently in
use in the circuit; two different two-factor standards, 169 a third standard
that juxtaposes the first two sets of factors to make one alternative test
standard, 170 and a fourth, sliding scale standard.171
The Tenth Circuit's sliding scale approach is of the Eighth Circuit
variety: the likelihood of success on the merits is to be weighed against
the three other factors.172 The ad hoc and arbitrary nature of this weigh-
ing process has already been discussed under the discussion of standards
in the Eighth Circuit.173
13. The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that Fifth Circuit cases are binding
precedent in the Eleventh Circuit.174 The circuit has clarified its declara-
tion in preliminary injunction cases by making substantial use of the
167. Costandi v. AAMCO Automatic Transmission, Inc., 456 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam).
168. San Diego Comm. Against Registration and the Draft Card v. Governing Bd., 790
F.2d 1471, 1473 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that "increase in meritoriousness" is tanta-
mount to increase in probability of success on merits). The "continuum" standard in the
Ninth Circuit is nothing but the "sliding scale" standard of other circuits. It follows, there-
fore, that the inverse relationship described by the Ninth Circuit refers to the relationship
between the probability of success on the merits and the movant's showing of irreparable
harm. This continuum is as problematic as the sliding scale of other circuits.
169. Armstrong v. Maple Leaf Apts., 508 F.2d 518, 524-25 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 901 (1980); Morton Salt Co. v. City of S. Hutchinson, 159 F.2d 897, 899-900 (10th
Cir. 1947).
170. Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Ref. Co., 338 F.2d 780, 781-82 (10th Cir. 1964) (per
curiam).
171. Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980). However, the court has not
always adhered to Lundgrin when invoking its name. See Wolf, supra note 30, at 225-26.
172. Lundgrin, 619 F.2d at 63.
173. See supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text (discussing Eighth Circuit preliminary
injunction standards).
174. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (1 1th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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four-factor standard of the Fifth Circuit's Canal Authority v. Callaway
case."17 The appropriation of such a four-factor standard suggests the
existence of a "factor relationship problem" since once again practition-
ers have no way of knowing the relationship among the four factors.
On balance, however, it is still too early to tell how many of the
Fifth Circuit's preliminary injunction problems will be inherited by the
Eleventh Circuit. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit may have implicitly re-
jected the idea of a "sliding scale." '17 6 Further, it appears that the Elev-
enth Circuit has been rather principled in its application of the four-
factor standard.
17 7
V. APPLICATION: THE POSNER RULE AND THE PROBABILITY OF
HARM MATRIX (PRPHM)
In the previous section of this Article, the application of the Posner
Rule was concerned with the identification of problems with the Supreme
Court's and the federal courts of appeals' preliminary injunction stan-
dards. This section focuses not so much on various preliminary injunc-
tion standards but the facts of various preliminary injunction cases in
order to define a matrix using the Posner Rule. The actual result of most
preliminary injunction decisions can be represented by a cell within the
matrix.
A. Rationale of the PRPHM
The analysis begins by rewriting the Posner Rule to define a new
variable. That is, rewriting the inequality of PHp> (l-P)Hd implies the
new inequality P/(1-P)[Hp/Hd] >U, where U is a variable of unknown
magnitude. Substituting Pm for the ratio of probabilities P/(1 - P) and
H, for the ratio of harms Hp/Hd, it becomes possible to discuss the vari-
ous possibilities suggested by the variable PmHn.
For example, if one assumes that the plaintiff's harm is much
greater than the defendant's harm (implying that Hp/Hd or Hn has a
value much greater than 1), and the plaintiff's probability of success on
the merits is less than the defendant's (implying that P(l-P) or that P/(1-
175. See Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1353-54
(11th Cir. 1982).
176. For an example of the Eleventh Circuit's rigidity, see National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Marsh, 721 F.2d 767, 786 (1 Ith Cir. 1983) (court discusses four "requirements" for issuance of
preliminary injunction).
177. Id. Denial of the preliminary injunction is not proper where the moving party made a
showing on all four factors. Id. This position is, of course, consistent with the Posner Rule.
Where either P. or Hp take on a value of zero, a preliminary injunction cannot issue.
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P) (or Pm) has a value less than 1), then in all likelihood the variable
PmHn will have a value that is greater than 1. This value of PmH, is
verbally equivalent to the case where a court states: Despite the fact that
the plaintiff has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits in this
case, the fact remains that the defendant will suffer greater harm than the
plaintiff should this injunction be issued.
This analysis, taken to its logical conclusion, implies that an infinite
number of combinations of Pm and H, may be used to describe the uni-
verse of judicial decisions in preliminary injunction cases. For purposes
of this discussion, however, four categories of probabilities, PO, P1, P2, P3
(m = 0, 1, 2, 3), and four categories of harm, Hi, Hj, Hk, H, (n = i, j, k,
1), are recognized. These eight categories, when juxtaposed, lead to a 4 X
4 matrix.
It follows that this 4 x 4 matrix will have 16 elements, each element
representing a different category of preliminary injunction cases, for a
total of 16 categories of cases. The verbal interpretation of these mathe-
matical symbols is as follows: The symbol Po represents the situation
where the plaintiff has virtually no possibility (e.g., "little chance") of
success on the merits. The symbol P1 represents the situation where the
plaintiff's probability of success on the merits of the case is less than the
defendant's probability of success (e.g., "no likelihood"). P2 is where the
plaintiff has an equal or greater chance than the defendant of succeeding
on the merits (e.g., "likelihood"). P3 is where the plaintiff has a much
greater chance than the defendant of succeeding on the merits (e.g., "sub-
stantial likelihood"). The harm symbols can be interpreted as follows:
Hi represents the situation where the plaintiff's harm is "much greater"
than the defendant's. Hj is where the plaintiff's harm is simply "greater"
than the defendant's. Hk is where the harms are approximately equal,
and H, is where the plaintiff experiences less or virtually no harm relative
to the defendant's harm. Once again, these four kinds of probabilities
and four kinds of harms can be juxtaposed in matrix form. This matrix,
the "Posner Rule Probability Harm Matrix" (PRPHM), is the subject of
Illustration 1. An example of the verbal equivalent for each particular
category is presented in Table 1.
Several things should be noted about Illustration 1 and Table 1.
First, the verbal interpretations of the mathematical symbols are only
approximations; the central ideas of the symbols can quite easily be con-
veyed using other verbal approximations. For this reason, the assign-
ment of any particular preliminary injunction case to a given category is
not hampered by an attempt to find a literal correspondence between the
words used by the court and those found in Table 1. It should also be
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ILLUSTRATION 1
The Posner Rule Probability Harm Matrix (PRPHM)
"Much "Greater "As Much "Less Harm
Greater Harm" Harm As" Than"
Harm"
Hi Hj H, H,
"Little Chance" Category Category Category Category"
", 1 2 3 4 /
Po PoHi PoHj PoH, PoH1
Hard Hard Deny 7 Deny
K (Easy) (Easy)
"No Likelihood" Category Category Category / Category
5 6 77 8P, PtHi PIHj PtHk PIHI
Hard Hardest Deny Deny
S ,,ZEasy) (Easy)
"As much Category Category , Category Category
Chance As" or 9 10 11 12
"Likelihood"
P2  P2Hi P2Hj P 2Hk P 2H,
Grant .Grant Hardest Deny
(Easy) ,/ (Easy) (Hard)
"Substantial Category/ Category Caegory Category
Likelihood" 13,' 14 15 16
P 3  P3Hi P3 Hj P3Hk P3HI
Grant Grant Grant Hard_\
(Easy) (Easy) (Easy)
Where: Po implies that P< <(1-P)
P, implies that P<(-P)
P 2 implies that P>I-P)
P 3 implies that P> >(l-P)
Hi implies that Hp> >Hd
Hj implies that Hp >H
Hk implies that Hp < <lid
H, implies that Hp<Hd
NOTE: The symbol.. means "approximately equal to"
The symbol > > means "much greater than"
The symbol < < means "much less than"
The symbol Pm (m = 0, 1, 2, 3) is equal to P/(1-P)
The symbol H. (n = i, j, k, 1) is equal to Hp/Hd
P = Probability that plaintiff will win the suit
(-P) = Probability that defendant will win the suit
Hp = Harm to plaintiff if she doesn't get injunction
1 = Harm to defendant if injunction is granted
1247
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
noted that the numerical values provided (0, 1, > 1, etc.) serve only as
points of reference, and that they have relative and not absolute
significance.
Second, the PRPHM is not really as daunting as it seems. In order
to facilitate the exposition, one diagonal of the matrix is represented by a
solid line. The group of preliminary injunction cases falling in the cate-
gories along this solid diagonal represent some of the most difficult cases
to decide. Why this is so is discussed further below. 178 The next group
of cases are hard cases which are in categories that do not fall along the
solid diagonal. Another group of cases is represented by the categories
falling along the dotted "easy" diagonal. Preliminary injunction cases
falling in the categories along the dotted diagonal are relatively easy
cases to decide. A final group of categories consists of cases falling off
the dotted diagonal that are also relatively easy to decide.
Third, like Newton's equation, the Posner Rule as developed in the
format of the PRPHM is a general formulation which allows one to ex-
plain exceptions. Specifically, the PRPHM makes it clear that one can-
not attempt to formulate a general standard for granting preliminary
injunctions based on one isolated case from one of the sixteen categories.
It is possible that, in at least some of the circuit court cases discussed
above, the courts have attempted to construct a general standard in this
fashion. The PRPHM makes it clear that such a case-specific method for
determining the proper standard for granting preliminary injunctions
necessarily leads to a multiplicity of preliminary injunction standards.
Alternatively stated, the Posner Rule is the preliminary injunction stan-
dard within which all other standards are subsumed.
Fourth, it should be clear from the PRPHM that the Posner Rule
envisions the possibility of a sliding scale. In alternative injunction rule
formulations, different variables have been permitted to "slide" with no
clear rationale as to why such sliding does or should take place. 1 9 The
PRPHM makes it clear that there is a tradeoff between the relative harm
between the parties, and the relative probability of success on the merits.
Since the PRPHM is based on the Posner Rule, the rationale for this
tradeoff is the same as the rationale which underlies the Posner Rule. 180
Fifth, it should be clear from the PRPHM that the harm to third
parties can easily be incorporated into the analysis. Although the term
"public interest" is non-descript, if a harm is identifiable by a judge, and
is irreparable, then the harm can enter in on the relevant side of the
178. See infra notes 183-201 and ac6ompanying text.
179. See supra notes 120-22, 129 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 70-84 and accompanying text.
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Table 1. Delineation of Categories in the PRPHM
Category Symbol Value
I P/(l-P)[H/Hd]=PoHi
2 P/(l -P)[H/Hd]=PHj
3 P/(l-P) ,/-I =PHk
4 P/(l-P)[-/H-I]=PoH
5 P/(l-P)[-/H-d]=PHj
6 P/(I-P)[H/Hd]=PHj
7 P/(l -P)[H/H1=PHk
8 P/(l-P)[HA H =PH,
9 P/(l-P)[H/-U =P2H.
10 P/(1-P)HP/H]=P 2Hj
11 P/(1-P)[Hp/Hdj=P 2Hk
12 P/( 1-P) [H-p/H-]= P2Hj
13 P/(1-P)[Hp/Hd] =P3H
14 P/(l-P)[Hp/Hd=P 3Hj
15 P/( -P)[HP/Hd] =P3Hk
16 P/(l-P)[Hp,/-=P 3H
Verbal Approximation
0 "Although the plaintiff will suffer much greater harm
than the defendant, there is no likelihood that he will
prevail on the merits."
0 "Although the plaintiff will suffer greater harm than the
defendant, there is no likelihood that he will prevail on
the merits."
0 "Although the plaintiff will suffer as much harm as the
defendant, there is no likelihood that he will prevail on
the merits."
0 "The plaintiff here will not prevail on the merits or
suffer irreparable harm."
>1 "Although the plaintiff will suffer much greater harm
than the defendant, there is no likelihood that she will
prevail on the merits."
< 1 "Although the plaintiff will suffer greater harm than the
defendant, there is no likelihood that she will prevail on
the merits."
< I "The plaintiff will suffer just as much harm as the
defendant, and there is no likelihood that she will prevail
on the merits."
0 "The plaintiff will not suffer any harm, and there is no
likelihood that she will prevail on the merits."
> >I "Although the plaintiff will suffer much greater harm
than the defendant, he has as much chance as the
defendant does of prevailing on the merits."
> I "Although the plaintiff will suffer greater harm than the
defendant, he has as much chance as the defendant does
of prevailing on the merits."
1 "The plaintiff will suffer as much harm as the defendant,
and has as much chance as the defendant does of
prevailing on the merits."
0 "The plaintiff will not suffer any harm, and has as much
chance as the defendant does of prevailing on the
merits."
0 "The plaintiff will suffer much greater harm than the
defendant, and has a substantial likelihood of prevailing
on the merits."
> > I "The plaintiff will suffer greater harm than the
defendant, and has a substantial likelihood of prevailing
on the merits."
> >1 "The plaintiff will suffer as much harm as the defendant,
and has a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the
merits."
0 "Although the plaintiff will suffer no harm, there is a
substantial likelihood that she will prevail on the
merits."
Posner Rule inequality. This position was taken by Judge Posner on the
"public interest" issue in American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital
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Products Ltd. 181
Finally, the odd beauty of the PRPHM is that it is both positive and
normative. In its positive sense, it is a system of categorization of the
various preliminary injunctions that have come before the courts. In its
normative sense, it dictates how preliminary injunctions should be issued
and allows an inference as to whether injunctions falling within the vari-
ous categories are correctly issued.
182
The reader should note that the following discussion is meant to
present a representative case for each of the 16 categories in the
PRPHM. Once again, readers are urged to focus on categories that are
of particular interest to them.
B. Hard (Solid) Diagonal Cases: Categories L 6, 11 and 16
1. Category 1
Cases falling in this category are preliminary injunction cases in
which the plaintiff has little chance of success on the merits and yet, if
the injunction is not granted, will suffer a harm much greater than the
defendant's if the injunction is granted. These cases are hard to decide
precisely because the difference between the expected harm of the parties
is so large. A judge might be concerned that plaintiff will have needlessly
suffered great irreparable injury in the event that she actually does win
the lawsuit and was not awarded the injunction.
For example, in Wilson v. Watt,183 the defendants did not contest
that the plaintiffs would suffer far greater irreparable injury than the de-
fendants if the plaintiffs' general assistance funds were cut off by injunc-
tion. 84 The court below found that the plaintiffs had no chance of
success on the merits and denied the preliminary injunction. 85 The
court of appeals reversed the trial court's holding and ruled that the
plaintiffs had demonstrated "a fair chance" of success on the question of
whether Congress intended to terminate the general assistance pro-
gram. 186 Wilson demonstrates the difficulty of deciding Category 1 cases.
If an appellate court can demonstrate that the probability of success on
181. 780 F.2d 589, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1986).
182. The PRPHM also suggests a host of research questions which cannot begin to be ad-
dressed here. For example, can one make an argument that various types of cases (e.g., con-
tract) do or should fall within various categories? What of statutory preliminary injunctions?
Are they confined to various categories? Questions such as these are made possible by the
PRPHM.
183. 703 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1983).
184. Id. at 399.
185. Id. at 398-99.
186. Id. at 403.
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the merits is higher than that assessed by the trial court, because of the
magnitude of the plaintiff's injury from denial of the injunction, the
court will have a realistic basis on which to reverse a denied injunction.
2. Category 6
Preliminary injunction cases in this category are cases in which the
plaintiff can demonstrate that he will suffer greater harm than the de-
fendant if he is not awarded the preliminary injunction. However, the
plaintiff has no likelihood of success on the merits. Therefore, a judge
must discount the plaintiff's great harm by a probability that is less than
50% and the defendant's lesser harm by a probability that is greater than
50%. These two discounted magnitudes must be compared in order to
determine which is greater. Because these two magnitudes are so close in
size, there is a great possibility for error in estimation and comparison.
Consider, for example, the case of McDonough v. Trustees of Univer-
sity System of New Hampshire.187 In that case, the plaintiff sought to
enjoin the defendant from terminating the plaintiff's contract as a non-
tenured professor at Keene State College."' 8 The plaintiff alleged that his
contract had been terminated because he was a Marxian economist.18 9
The district court denied the injunction on the ground that plaintiff had
not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. 190
Although the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district
court, it noted the difficulty of the case.' 91 Assessing the plaintiff's
probability of success on the merits was made difficult because of the
interests involved and the "fact-oriented" nature of the dispute.192
3. Category 11
Preliminary injunction cases falling in this category are those cases
in which the irreparable harm to be suffered by the parties is almost ex-
actly equal. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the probabili-
ties of success are also almost exactly equal, or at best, the plaintiff has "a
likelihood of success on the merits." Cases falling in this category are
difficult to decide for the same reason as for Category 6 cases. 193
Consider, for example, the case of Texas v. Seatrain International,
187. 704 F.2d 780 (1st Cir. 1983).
188. Id. at 781.
189. Id. at 781-82.
190. Id. at 781.
191. Id. at 784.
192. Id.
193. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
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S.A. '94 In that case, the defendant requested a tariff from the Federal
Maritime Commission.'95 The plaintiff sought to enjoin the use of the
tariff during the administrative process on the grounds that the tariff
would decrease revenues from Texas courts.' 96 The court of appeals re-
versed the preliminary injunction on the grounds that the injunction had
merely shifted the "virtually identical injury" which existed between the
parties.
197
4. Category 16
Preliminary injunction cases in this category are those cases in
which plaintiff has not made a showing of irreparable harm, or will not
suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied, yet plaintiff has a sub-
stantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits. Alternatively stated,
these are cases in which the plaintiff's irreparable injury is far less than
that to be suffered by the defendant if the injunction is issued. Like Cate-
gory 1 cases, the difficulty with cases falling in Category 16 is that the
plaintiff may suffer needless irreparable injury. The difficulty here is not
so much with the magnitude of the plaintiff's irreparable injury, but the
needlessness of it. The plaintiff, after all, has a high probability of suc-
ceeding at the end of the lawsuit.
In Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Department of the
Navy,'98 the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Navy's construction of a port
for battleships pending the Navy's compliance with the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).199 The district court found that
the plaintiffs had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, but
denied the injunction since plaintiffs had failed to allege that denial of the
injunction would result in irreparable injury."0° The court of appeals up-
held the denial of the preliminary injunction, but did so on other
grounds.
20 1
194. 518 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1975).
195. Id at 177.
196. Id. at 177-78.
197. Id. at 181. The court of appeals noted the difficulty of the case. The court observed
that the plaintiffs had a "less-than-overpowering" prospect of success on the merits. Id. at 182.
Although the showing was independently sufficient to preclude the denial of a preliminary
injunction, such a denial was warranted in view of the symmetry of irreparable injury between
the parties and deference to the administrative process. Id.
198. 836 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
199. Id. at 761.
200. Id. at 761-62.
201. d at 764.
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C. Hard Off-Diagonal Cases: Categories 2, 5, 12 and 15
1. Category 2
Preliminary injunction cases in this category are cases in which the
plaintiff will suffer greater irreparable injury than the defendant if the
injunction is not issued. Here, however, the plaintiff has little or no
chance of success oni the merits. Although these cases are not as difficult
as Category 1 cases,20 2 they are difficult for a similar reason. Despite the
plaintiff's slight chance of success on the merits, a judge might be con-
cerned about the disparity of harm, and the fact that plaintiff may suffer
a relatively large needless harm.
In Berry v. Bean,2"3 the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from
forbidding the plaintiff from living with the members of her family on an
Air Force base.2° The district court granted the injunction, finding that
the defendant's irreparable injury was "minimal" in comparison to that
of the plaintiff if the injunction were denied.20 5 In reversing the grant of
preliminary injunction, the court of appeals took great pains to demon-
strate that the plaintiff had no chance of success on the merits. 20 6 The
court stated forcefully that great deference had to be given by courts of
law to military decisions.20 7
2. Category 5
Preliminary injunction cases in this Category are cases in which the
plaintiff will suffer much greater harm than the defendant, if the injunc-
tion is not issued. Yet, here, the plaintiff has no likelihood of success on
the merits. The difficulties with deciding these cases represent a combi-
nation of the difficulties of Category 6208 and Category 1209 cases. Like
Category 6 cases, the magnitudes of the Posner Rule variables are close
in size. There is, therefore, the possibility of misestimation. Like Cate-
gory 1 cases, a judge might be concerned with the large irreparable harm
which the plaintiff may needlessly suffer.
In LeBeau v. Spirito,21° the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant
from terminating Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
202. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
203. 796 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1986).
204. Id. at 714.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 716-19.
207. Id at 716-17. Despite this deference, however, the court found it necessary to engage
in a lengthy discussion justifying the decision of the Air Force Commander. See id. at 717-18.
208. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
210. 703 F.2d 639 (1st Cir. 1983).
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benefits based on the defendant's inadequate notice of the termination of
benefits.211 The district court denied the injunction on the grounds that
the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the mer-
its.212 In affirming the district court, the court of appeals noted that wel-
fare recipients had a "substantial" interest in the proper determination of
their benefits by welfare agencies.213
3. Category 12
Preliminary injunction cases in this category are cases in which the
plaintiff will suffer less irreparable harm than the defendant, or for that
matter has failed to make a showing of irreparable injury altogether.
Here, the plaintiff's chances of success on the merits are equal to those of
the defendant, or at best, the plaintiff has demonstrated "a likelihood" of
succeeding on the merits. The Posner Rule calls for the denial of the
preliminary injunction in this instance. The expected harm to the plain-
tiff if the injunction is denied is unambiguously less than the expected
harm to the defendant if the injunction is granted. Any difficulty that
might inhere in these cases comes from a possible misestimation of the
magnitude of the plaintiff's harm. This is especially true where the
plaintiff has failed to make a showing of irreparable harm.
For example, in A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission,214
the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Commission (FTC) from enforcing a
regulation which required plaintiffs to file a series of business reports.21
In vacating the district court's grant of the preliminary injunction,216 the
court of appeals did not address the district court's determination that
the plaintiffs had proved a likelihood of success on the merits.21 7 How-
ever, the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish
that the costs of complying with the FTC's regulation constituted an ir-
211. Id at 640. The disparity of harm is almost exactly equal to the disparity discussed in
Wilson v. Watt, 703 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1983); see supra notes 183-86 and accompanying
text. That is, the interests of welfare recipients in LeBeau far outweighed any interests the
State may have had at stake. LeBeau, 703 F.2d at 644.
212. LeBeau, 703 F.2d at 642-43.
213. Id. at 644. Unlike the court in Wilson, however, the court in LeBeau did not have to
resort to construing Congress' intent in enacting the relevant statute. Compare LeBeau, 703
F.2d at 643 and Wilson, 703 F.2d at 399-403. The LeBeau court applied the statutory lan-
guage and concluded that the plaintiffs had no likelihood of success on the merits in spite of
their "substantial" interests. LeBeau, 703 F.2d at 643-44. From the approach of these two
courts, it is possible to conclude that Category 6 cases are more difficult to decide than Cate-
gory 5 cases.
214. 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976).
215. Id. at 518.
216. Id. at 529.
217. Id at 519.
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reparable injury.218 The court of appeals concluded that injury to the
plaintiffs would be relatively minimal.
219
4. Category 15
Preliminary injunction cases in this category are cases in which the
irreparable harms to be suffered by the parties are rather similar. Here,
however, the plaintiff is able to establish a substantial likelihood that she
will prevail on the merits. The Posner Rule dictates that the court
should grant the injunction because the expected harm to the plaintiff
outveighs the expected harm to the defendant. Any difficulties arising
would come from the misestimation of the magnitude of the harms to the
parties.
In Educational Testing Services v. Katzman,22° the plaintiff sought to
enjoin the defendant from using the plaintiff's confidential test questions
as test-coaching materials. 221 The district court granted the injunc-
tion.222 In affirming plaintiff's preliminary injunction, the court of ap-
peals held that the plaintiff had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of
success on its copyright claim.223 Perhaps it is for this reason that the
appellate court did not pay much attention to the plaintiff's irreparable
injury. The court of appeals agreed with the district court that the plain-
tiff's testing program would have been "severely disrupted" in the ab-
sence of a preliminary injunction.224 It is clear, then, that this symmetry
of harm was somewhat irrelevant to the court, in view of the plaintiff's
substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
D. Easy (Dotted) Diagonal Cases: Categories 4, 7, 10 and 13
1. Category 4
Preliminary injunction cases in this category are cases in which the
plaintiff has demonstrated little or no chance of success on the merits.
Moreover, the plaintiff has usually failed to demonstrate either irrepara-
ble injury from the denial of the injunction, or less irreparable injury
than that to be suffered by the defendant if the injunction is granted. The
Posner Rule dictates that the injunction should be denied for cases in this
218. Id. at 527-28.
219. Id.
220. 793 F.2d 533 (3d Cir. 1986).
221. Id. at 535.
222. Id. at 536-37.
223. Id. at 538-43.
224. Id. at 543-44. Of course, the defendant could have made a comparable argument that
its test-coaching program would have been severely disrupted by the granting of a preliminary
injunction.
1255
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
category. Denial of the injunction creates no ambiguity; the expected
harm to the plaintiff is far less than the expected harm to the defendant.
In lUInternational Corp. v. NXAcquisition Corp.,225 the plaintiff, a
target corporation, sought to enjoin a tender offer by the defendant by
arguing that the Williams Act22 6 imposed certain financing constraints
on the defendant. 27 The court of appeals affirmed the district court's
denial of the injunction on the grounds that the plaintiff had no chance of
success on the merits and had failed to establish irreparable injury.228
2. Category 7
Preliminary injunction cases in this category are cases in which
there is a symmetry of irreparable harm as between the parties. Here,
however, the plaintiff has no likelihood of success on the merits. The
Posner Rule dictates that the preliminary injunctions falling in this cate-
gory should be denied.
Consider, for example, the case of Cintron-Garcia v. Romero-
Barcelo.2 9 In this case, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from
filling a between-elections vacancy in the Puerto Rico House of Repre-
sentatives.2 30 The district court granted the injunction. 231 The court of
appeals vacated the injunction, holding that the irreparable injury to the
parties was exactly balanced. 32 Additionally, the plaintiff had failed to
show a likelihood of success on the merits.2 33
3. Category 10
Cases in this category represent the most standard and typical of
preliminary injunction cases. In these cases, the plaintiff has demon-
strated that she will suffer greater irreparable harm than the defendant if
she is not awarded the injunction. She has also usually demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits. The Posner Rule dictates that the
injunction should be granted in this instance. Courts usually have no
difficulty in awarding these injunctions.
In Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp.,234 the plaintiff sought to have the
225. 840 F.2d 220 (4th Cir.), aff'd en banc, 840 F.2d 229 (1988).
226. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n (1988).
227. IU Int'l, 840 F.2d at 221.
228. Id at 223-24.
229. 671 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982).
230, Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1-3.
233. Id. at 7.
234. 797 F.2d 43 (Ist Cir. 1986).
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defendant set aside an amount to satisfy the plaintiff's judgment in view
of the defendant's sale of substantially all of its assets.235 The district
court held that the plaintiff had a likelihood of success on defendant's
U.C.C. and duress claims.236 The district court also held that the plain-
tiff had demonstrated greater irreparable injury by virtue of defendant's
liquidation of its assets.237 The court of appeals affirmed the
injunction.238
4. Category 13
Preliminary injunction cases in this category are perhaps the easiest
of cases in which to grant a preliminary injunction. In these cases, the
plaintiff has succeeded in showing not only that she will suffer much
greater irreparable injury than the defendant if the injunction is not
awarded, but she has also succeeded in demonstrating a substantial likeli-
hood of succeeding on the merits.
In United States v. Odessa Union Warehouse Cooperative,239 the fed-
eral government sought to enjoin the defendant's sale and movement of
wheat which was "moldy and contaminated with live and dead insects,
insect larvae and rodent excreta. ' '"2 ' The district court denied the in-
junction claiming that "this Court has developed [its] own list of condi-
tions and feels that a preliminary injunction should issue only when the
circumstances truly permit no other course ... "241 The circuit court
had no difficulty in reversing the district court.2 42 The appellate court
held that plaintiff had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.2 4 3
E. Easy Off-Diagonal Cases: Categories 3, 8, 9 and 14
1. Category 3
Preliminary injunction cases in this category present situations in
which the irreparable harm to the parties is symmetrical, yet the plaintiff
has little or no chance of success on the merits. The Posner Rule dictates
235. Id. at 44-45.
236. Id. at 55-57.
237. Id. at 53.
238. Id. at 57.
239. 833 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1987).
240. Id. at 174. The evidence of the defendant's violation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act was uncontested. Id.
241. Id. at 175 (quoting lower court opinion).
242. Id. at 177.
243. Id. at 176. The Ninth Circuit also noted that the district court had not adequately
considered the irreparable injury to the public that could result from the denial of the injunc-
tion. Id.
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that preliminary injunctions should be denied in cases falling in this
category.
In Higbee v. Starr,2" the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant
from evicting the plaintiff from her residence.245 The court of appeals
noted that plaintiff's deprivation of a place to live constituted irreparable
harm.246 Yet, the court denied the injunction finding that the plaintiff
had little chance of success on the merits. 247 The court did not explicitly
consider the irreparable harm to the defendant. 45
2. Category 8
Preliminary injunction cases in this category are cases in which the
plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. In
addition, the plaintiff has not made a showing of irreparable injury, or at
best will suffer less harm than the defendant if the plaintiff is not awarded
the injunction. Courts usually have no difficulty in denying these injunc-
tions; 'an application of the Posner Rule warrants such an outcome.
For example, in Adamsons v. Wharton 249 the plaintiff sought to en-
join the defendant from suspending the plaintiff from a state medical
school faculty after the plaintiff had refused to participate in a clinical
program that would have limited the extent of his income from private
practice.250 The court of appeals agreed with the district court that the
first amendment does "not protect a faculty member's quest for outside
income. '  Accordingly, the appellate court said the plaintiff had no
likelihood of success on the merits and had made no showing of irrepara-
ble injury that could not be compensated by money damages. 25 2 The
appellate court affirmed the district court denial of the injunction.
253
244. 698 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1983).
245. Id. at 946. The plaintiff alleged that the eviction was in retaliation for a prior com-
plaint that she had filed against the defendant. Id. The district court found that the plaintiff
had no chance of success on the merits since she could not establish a connection between her
complaint and the termination of her lease. Id. at 946-47.
246. Id. at 947.
247. Id.
248. Id. However, one might make a plausible argument that the defendants would have
suffered just as much had the injunction been issued. The defendant had alleged that it was
necessary to evict the plaintiff because the plaintiff kept a "large number of uncontrolled ani-
mals... on the property," which damaged the house and caused problems with neighbors. Id.
249. 771 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1985).
250. Id. at 42.
251. Id. at 43.
252. Id. at 43-44.
253. Id. at 44.
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3. Category 9
Preliminary injunction cases in this category are cases in which it is
relatively easy to grant the injunctions. In these cases, the plaintiff is able
to demonstrate that she will suffer a much greater irreparable harm than
the defendant if she is not awarded the injunction. The plaintiff is also
able to show a likelihood of success on the merits. The Posner Rule
suggests that the court award the injunction.
For instance, in Selchow & Righter Co. v. McGraw-Hill Book Co.,254
the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from publishing a dictionary
which infringed on the plaintiff's trademark "Scrabble." '255 The district
court found that use of the plaintiff's trademark might render it ge-
neric.256 The court of appeals agreed that the plaintiff had demonstrated
irreparable injury stating that "[t]hreatened destruction or serious dilu-
tion of the mark may well be found substantially to outweigh any possi-
ble loss to [the] defendant during the pendency of this litigation."257
4. Category 14
Preliminary injunction cases in this category are also rather easy
cases in which to grant the injunction. In these cases, plaintiff success-
fully shows that she will suffer greater irreparable harm than the defend-
ant if she is not awarded the injunction. Moreover, the plaintiff has a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits. A very good case in point
is American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd.258 That case
need not be discussed again at this juncture. The reader is invited to
consult the discussion above as evidence that American Hospital is indeed
a Category 14 case. 59
VI. SELECTED CRITICISMS OF THE MODEL
The potential criticisms of the Posner Rule are various and sun-
dry.2 6' They include observations which represent general opposition to
the economic and statistical analysis of the law, as well as differences
regarding intricacies of the analysis. This section attempts, without be-
254. 580 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1978).
255. Id. at 26.
256. Id. at 27.
257. Id. at 28.
258. 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986).
259. See supra notes 37-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of American Hosp.
260. Some examples of criticisms of the economic approach to legal analysis include:
Priest, The New Scientism in Legal Scholarship: A Comment on Clark and Posner, 90 YALE
L.J. 1284 (1981); Roberts, Beaches: The Efficiency of the Common Law and Other Fairy Tales,
28 UCLA L. REv. 169 (1981); Note, The Inefficient Common Law, 92 YALE L.J. 862 (1983).
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ing exhaustive, to further specify and address some of the issues raised.261
The criticisms discussed below have the greatest potential for damaging
the analysis.
A. Quantification and the Posner Rule
The first criticism that one might make is that the Posner Rule is of
no use to legal practitioners because the Rule clearly requires that all
magnitudes be quantifiable. Moreover, the Posner Rule can be turned on
its head: if everything is quantifiable, then damages are quantifiable, and
therefore, the litigants' harms are not irreparable. Therefore, it is impos-
sible for the Posner Rule to address the granting of preliminary injunc-
tions. This latter argument misses the point that was made in American
Hospital Supply Corp. v.. Hospital Products Ltd.262 Specifically, a refer-
ence to the irreparability of the harm of a litigant is mainly a reference to
the fact that damages are unavailable, not unquantifiable.2 63 The case of
a bankrupt defendant is the clearest illustration of this. In the case of
environmental damages, one can argue that damages are of such a large
magnitude that they are in fact unavailable.2e
In an interesting piece which challenges the legitimacy and propri-
ety of the Posner Rule, Professor Linda Mullenix has fashioned a criti-
cism which is a variant of the quantification criticism.265 Professor
261. One might argue that the Posner Rule does not consider:
a) the argument that the standard on appeal is that of reviewing the lower court's abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 594
(7th Cir. 1986). Under the Posner Rule, however, this inquiry into a court's abuse of discre-
tion is in reality an examination of that court's deviation from the proper application of the
Rule. See Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc. 749 F.2d 380, 390-93 (7th Cir. 1984) (en
banc).
b) that the standard should differ when a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) is the
instrument under discussion. The rationale underlying the argument would be that the deci-
sion as to whether or not to grant a TRO involves even less time than a regular injunction.
However, the Posner Rule is broad enough to cover this situation. One could argue, for exam-
ple, that the TRO simply represents a case where the perceived immediacy of the pending
harm is greater than in the preliminary injunction case. One would conclude that the esti-
mates of all of the variables and especially the probabilities, see supra note 84, should be sub-
ject to wider bands of uncertainty, see supra note 69. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
262. 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986).
263. Id. at 595-96.
264. Yet, even if one does not subscribe to the sophistry that everything in the universe is
ultimately quantifiable (a sophistry to which this author subscribes), such non-subscription
does not offer a defensible basis on which to criticize the Posner Rule. The Posner Rule re-
mains valuable even for those who do not see the world quantitatively. For example, surely
any judge can get an intuitive sense for the assertion that only one fifth of the harm alleged by
the plaintiff is to be weighed against four fifths of the harm alleged by the defendant. The
harms in question need not be quantified.
265. See Mullenix, Burying (With Kindness) the Felicific Calculus of Civil Procedure, 40
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Mullenix's variation has three strands. The first strand is that lawyers
will be able to manipulate the mathematical calculation very easily.266
However, successful manipulation is probably the very essence of good
lawyering. Therefore, Professor Mullenix surely cannot be objecting to
manipulation in the abstract. It follows then that her objection is proba-
bly that the Posner Rule is more manipulable than the alternative rule(s).
Having defined the issue in this manner, the real problem becomes
one of defining the standard by which "manipulability" is determined.
Regardless of the standard selected, there can be little debate that the
multiplicity of available preliminary injunction standards affords an at-
torney remarkable opportunities for manipulation.267 Such opportunities
are significantly reduced given the singularity and the intellectual clarity
of the Posner Rule.
The second strand of Professor Mullenix's argument is that with
"quantification as the operational standard," the attorney who is able to
summon the best figures will ultimately prevail.268 Practically, the re-
sulting "contest" between "academic economists" in litigation will in-
crease the "direct costs of litigation and will make basic procedural
motions more complex and inscrutable." '269
This strand of Professor Mullenix's criticism is essentially a specula-
tion which, like all speculations, invites a counter-speculation. Specifi-
cally, one might imagine a statute which limits the number of experts
each litigant may present at an injunction hearing. Under such a statute,
the total costs of litigation would decrease rather than increase. First,
fewer injunction motions would be filed, since prospective litigants and
their attorneys would merely have to consult the Matrix (PRPHM4)270 to
ascertain their chance of success in an injunction motion. Second, given
the clarifying effect of the Posner Rule, the length of documents submit-
ted and hearings conducted would decrease dramatically. Limiting the
number of experts testifying would probably eliminate such excessive tes-
timony as a source of higher litigation costs.
The third strand of Professor Mullenix's argument is that the nature
of the Rule may induce attorneys to "ignore selected unquantifiable fac-
VAND. L. Rnv. 541 (1987). Technically, Mullenix's criticism is primarily levied against the
Leubsdorf Rule and not the Posner Rule. For purposes of this discussion, however, they will
be treated as being similar. See infra note 300.
266. Mullenix, supra note 265, at 565.
267. See supra notes 101-77 and accompanying text (Part IV).
268. Mullenix, supra note 265, at 565.
269. Id.
270. See supra notes 178-259 and accompanying text (Part V) (providing Matrix and dis-
cussion thereon).
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tors such as litigant's risk-taking disposition. '271  Indeed, this last strand
is in effect a thorough validation of the practicality of the Rule. In view
of the arguments discussed above,272 Professor Mullenix cannot mean by
her criticism that the Rule encourages attorneys to ignore factors that are
literally unquantifiable. Presumably, Professor Mullenix means that the
Rule encourages attorneys to ignore factors which are difficult (and
costly) to quantify yet yield no commensurate benefit from quantifica-
tion. This result is in accord with Professor Mullenix's legitimate goal of
minimizing litigation costs.
B. Statistical Assumptions and the Law273
A clear assumption of the Posner Rule is that the participants in the
litigation process are capable of estimating probabilities. 274 Therefore,
the Posner Rule might be subjected to a common criticism that is ad-
vanced in discussions of statistics and the law-that it is unrealistic to
assume that this estimation of probabilities is possible.27 Such a criti-
cism ignores the existence of the "subjective probability" school of
probability theory, a school which has existed formally for the past fifty
years.2 76 The modem relevance of that school is reflected in the observa-
tion that "[t]he numbers jurors might supply if asked to quantify their
personal beliefs can therefore be viewed as approximations of the theoret-
ically satisfactory probabilities. In this way, the probabilities at work in
a legal factfinding can be given a conceptually meaningful subjective
interpretation. "277
Those who take issue with this observation assume that jurors are
incapable of estimating the magnitudes of probabilities. However, since
it is a fact that the American jurisprudential system is premised on the
271. Mullenix, supra note 265, at 565.
272. See supra notes 265-70 and accompanying text.
273. The discussion of these assumptions in the literature focuses on the relevance of
Bayesian statistics in the legal setting. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 84, at 93-98; Kaye, The
Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 34, 42 n.31 (1979). Baye's
Theorem assigns to each factor that is weighed in a decision a numerical value in a probability
formula. See, e.g., Kaye, supra, at 49-51, for examples of the Bayesian equation. Although the
Posner Rule assumes a posterior probability and is therefore Bayesian in its approach, it is
nonetheless true that the use of classical hypothesis testing is a superior way of explicating the
Rule.
274. See generally Mullenix, supra note 265, at 562-63. This assumption appears to be the
engine of the Posner Rule analysis. A failure of this assumption implies that it is wholly
inappropriate to discuss the use of statistics by the parties involved in the litigation process.
275. See generally id. at 566-69.
276. A brief history and bibliography of subjective probability can be found in Kaye, supra
note 273, at 42 n.31.
277. Id. at 47.
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juror's ability to differentiate at a minimum between probabilities above
and below fifty percent, it follows that the probability estimations re-
quired by the Posner Rule are not at all unrealistic.
278
In challenging the statistical bases of the Posner Rule, Professor
Mullenix argues that the Rule "suffers from three major flaws." 279 The
first flaw, demonstrated by way of example, is that a change in the
probability of success on the merits by one percentage point would cause
an otherwise victorious plaintiff to lose the injunction.2 80 How it is that
such an example demonstrates a "flaw" is not clear. As discussed above,
in American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd.,281 the oc-
currence of these situations can be minimized by using high and low
probability estimates.282 This practice is not different from the "confi-
dence interval" estimation practice of professional statisticians. 283 Once
again, the relevant standard must be a relative one. It is far more prefer-
able that the justice system have a number of judges using the Posner
Rule who commit an estimation error than to have an equivalent number
of judges who issue injunction rulings which are fundamentally flawed
yet magically consistent with an unintelligible "traditional" standard.
278. Indeed, there are many standards in American jurisprudence which, though not imme-
diately "quantifiable," nonetheless demonstrate probabilities from 0 to 100%. For example,
the terms "colorable," "prima facie," "preponderance of the evidence," and "beyond a reason-
able doubt," in order of least to greatest "percentage" required by the law, demonstrate that
quantifying does take place in American courts.
It should be noted here that a second, more esoteric statistical criticism relevant to the
Posner Rule is that the statistical axioms which hold that the probability of A and the
probability of not-A sum to one are axioms inapplicable to a legal setting. See E. MANSFIELD,
supra note 84, at 73-74. This criticism is one which has been asserted by Cohen who claims to
have identified six anomalies that demonstrate the validity of his criticism. See L.J COHEN,
THE PROVABLE AND PROBABLE 116 (1977). Professor Kaye's rebuttal to Cohen is as follows:
Whatever puzzlement is produced by Cohen's "anomalies" is, I think, attributable to
an underlying misconception about the role of probability theory in legal proof. Con-
ventional probability theory does not purport to describe the structure of current
legal doctrine. Rather, it prescribes how probabilistic evidence should be handled if
one is to make the fewest mistakes in predicting the outcome of uncertain events.
Kaye, supra note 273, at 38. Professor Kaye. illustrates this statement by showing that
probability theory can be used to predict the probability that the first two cards of a deck will
be red. Id. at 38-39. It follows that probability "theory should be no less accurate for making
'postdictions,' or findings of fact." Id. at 39. In summarizing, Professor Kaye states, "[t]hat
the present rules of evidence and procedure do not invariably appear to promote this ideal of
accuracy does not impugn the accuracy of probability theory as a tool in legal factfinding." Id.
279. Mullenix, supra note 265, at 566.
280. Id. at 566-67. Mullenix is referring to the probability of winning the injunction which,
for purposes of this discussion, is treated as being the same as the probability of winning the
suit on the merits. See infra note 300.
281. 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986).
282. See supra note 69 (providing example).
283. See generally E. MANSFIELD, supra note 84, at 241-63.
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The second major flaw identified by Professor Mullenix is the Rule's
reliance on a probability estimation process that depends on an "intuitive
guess by the judge. ' 284 This, however, is no flaw. Indeed, what Profes-
sor Mullenix has succeeded in doing is identifying one of the irrefutable
strengths of the Rule. The Rule demands that judges stop implying that
they are engaged in generating anything but an intuitive guess. The Rule
demands that judges disabuse their decision-making process of bland
generalizations and rationalizations. With guesses clearly exposed, liti-
gants and reviewing courts get an opportunity to comment on the accu-
racy of the judge's guess.
The third major flaw identified by Professor Mullenix is that the
Rule places a "religious faith" in probability theory.285 Professor Mul-
lenix asserts that such a faith is inappropriate, because the probabilities
under discussion are not "assessable. 2 6 She claims that this unasses-
sability obtains because each legal case is unique, and additionally, be-
cause judges have a limited number of statistical samples.287 Professor
Mullenix's observations are, unfortunately, a denial of reality. Attorneys
in practice often must engage in the business of assessing probabilities of
litigation success for clients, or discussing those probabilities with their
partners and associates. The issue therefore is not a question of the as-
sessability of probabilities.288 Furthermore, that each legal case should
be unique in some faraway epistemological sense is a truism. Yet the
noble endeavor in which Professor Mullenix is engaged, that of legal
scholarship, is premised on the foundational assumption that commonal-
ities exist among these otherwise unique cases. Stare decisis is also pre-
mised on this foundational assumption, and so therefore is the
assessment of litigation probabilities.
It should be noted, however, that Professor Mullenix does raise a
very valid point about the judge's limited statistical sample size.289 One
might argue that a judge's litigation sample is not limited to the cases
that come before her. Indeed, each case to which a judge is exposed,
either through reading or listening, becomes an effective sample in her
284. Mullenix, supra note 265, at 567.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 568.
287. Id. at 569. See supra note 3 and accompanying text for a discussion of the determin-
ism-indeterminism argument which is a redux of this argument.
288. Assessability is a moot point: probabilities are natural objects existing in time and
space independent of our knowledge of their existence. The relevant issue is our ability to
correctly estimate those probabilities. We know of our accuracy after the events in question
have come to pass.
289. Mullenix, supra note 265, at 569.
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statistical sampling.29
In sum, it seems that the assumptions of statistical analysis are not
necessarily invalid in a legal setting. A decisive argument in support of
this assertion is that the falsification of statistical assumptions within a
legal setting appears to be a sport pursued for its own sake. Professor
Kaye has noted that:
The equations of the axiomatized theory of probability-like
the rules of logic and arithmetic-work admirably in other con-
texts .... [T]he mathematical theory provides more useful and
more accurate predictions of important phenomena than any
alternative methods. Surely the probability axioms work suffi-
ciently well for objectively estimated probabilities. Why should
they not serve as well when applied to thoughtful, subjective
estimates? Perhaps the laws of probability really are suspended
in the courtroom, but the burden of proof should fall on those
who claim that other ways of reasoning about probabilities may
be more accurate.29a
C. Implicit Subjectivity and Illusory Objectivity
Using these two headings, Professor Mullenix makes two argu-
ments. 92 First, she argues that the Posner Rule gives "the false impres-
sion that [it] eliminate[s] subjectivity in the injunctive process. '' 293 In
contrast, she asserts the "traditional" standard deals with this subjectiv-
ity, since the judge "mediates these [subjective] values and renders justice
in a flexible manner. '2 94 This, it is argued, is tantamount to "intellectual
honesty.
295
There are flaws in Professor Mullenix's argument. First, her claim
that the Rule eliminates subjectivity is unsound. No credible human in-
tellectual endeavor can lay claim to fully eliminating subjectivity. In-
deed, the Posner Rule's only claim, implicit or otherwise, is that it
exposes and delimits'subjectivity. 296 That this should be a noble goal is
290. For example, a judge's sampling can be and is increased by the litigants who often will
cite non-controlling but precedent-setting cases from other jurisdictions in their pleadings.
291. Kaye, supra note 273, at 55.
292. Mullenix, supra note 265, at 569-72.
293. Id. at 570.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See generally American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd., 780 F.2d
589, 593-94 (7th Cir. 1986), for the proposition that the preliminary injunction case law is in a
state of confusion. It follows that when the law is in a confused state, judges are in a position to
exercise a high degree of subjectivity in their rulings. Accordingly, the Posner Rule's objective
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clear from Professor Mullenix's implicit claim that the "traditional"
standard(s) is (are) more successful than the Posner Rule in delimiting
subjectivity in the injunctive process.
The second flaw in Mullenix's argument, therefore, is that it is diffi-
cult to determine precisely which "traditional" standard she is referring
to.29 7 Assuming that this difficulty can be surmounted, there is a third
flaw: it is not easily determinable precisely how it is that a judge "medi-
ates" the various subjective values in the injunctive process using the
"traditional" standard. The Posner Rule delineates the precise manner
in which this mediation unwittingly does occur and ideally should oc-
cur.2 9 Indeed, it is the Posner Rule which strikes a blow for intellectual
honesty.
Professor Mullenix's argument regarding "illusory objectivity" suf-
fers from problems similar to those found in her argument regarding im-
plicit objectivity. She states: "[tihe central evil of illusory objectivity is
that it conceals the true basis for decision and, therefore, increases the
possibility of manipulation," and that the "final objection to a calculus of
civil procedure is simply that it is fraudulent." '299 Mullenix's criticism
begs the question of how it is that logical symbolism (calculus) once used
in the domain of legal analysis, suddenly confers upon that analysis an
appearance of objectivity. One would be hard-pressed to find a reputable
social scientist who honestly believes that the use of logical symbolism
makes inherently subjective analysis less subjective. A symbolic logician
of such a persuasion would be even harder to find. The putative cost of a
symbolic analysis is likely present only in the minds of those who oppose
the analysis. The benefits of such an analysis however, are clear: rele-
vant factors are delineated; the relationship among them is demon-
strated; an overarching framework is postulated; and, discussion and
argumentation are made remarkably more efficient.3"°
of minimizing or eliminating the confusion in the preliminary injunction case law carries with
it an implicit objective of delimiting judicial subjectivity.
297. See supra notes 101-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of various "tradi-
tional," multi-part standards (Part IV).
298. See supra notes 178-259 and accompanying text (Part V) (providing Matrix and dis-
cussion thereof).
299. Mullenix, supra note 265, at 572.
300. There remains one rather esoteric issue or criticism regarding the Posner Rule. That
issue turns on the nature of the probability to be used in evaluating the potential harm to the
litigants. It has been assumed throughout this Article that a litigant's probability of success on
the merits of the case is the same probability to be used in evaluating the potential harm to the
litigant. The Leubsdorf Rule asserts that the relevant probability is the probability that the
litigant will prevail on the injunction and not the merits of the actual case. Leubsdorf, supra
note 43, at 557.
Indeed, there are at least five arguments which could be made that the Posner Rule's
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VII. SUMMARY/CONCLUSION
It has been argued in this Article that the Posner Rule should be the
probability usage is incorrect. First, it could be argued that use of the merit probability as-
sumes that the judge has already estimated this probability. Such an assumption implies that
the judge has prejudiced the outcome of the case by prejudging on the basis of what little
evidence is available during the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction.
This first argument fails because it seems to reverse the clear purpose of judicial estima-
tion of the merit probability. One must begin by recognizing that the court's early opinion of
the case is a natural phenomenon and indeed, a phenomenon which is essential to the analysis.
The nature of the preliminary injunction is such that an early and estimated probability is
indispensable to its effective utilization. It follows therefore that in this regard the Posner Rule
is very realistic; not only does the Rule recoguize the inescapable reality of a court's
probability estimation, but it actively encourages that a judge reveal her bias regarding the
nature and magnitude of the merit probability.
Second, it could be argued that there would almost never be a case where the probability
estimated at the start of the suit equals the actual merit probability. Since a changing estimate
is an estimate that could not have been correct in the first instance, this implies that there is a
permanent wedge between the initially and subsequently estimated merit probability. There-
fore, use of the initially estimated probability cannot be correct.
This second argument is erroneous because it does not necessarily follow that because the
merit probability is misestimated, that there is a permanent wedge between the estimated and
actual merit probabilities. The existence of a permanent wedge implies that judges consistently
make the same estimation mistakes or that they have "adaptive expectations." Under the
more modem "rational expectations hypothesis," over time judges learn from their misestima-
tions and correct them, thereby eliminating the possibility of a permanent wedge. See gener-
ally R. DORNBUSCH & S. FISCHER, MACROECONOMICS 509-10 (4th ed. 1987).
Third, it could be argued that the merit probability cannot be the correct probability to
use since the correct probability is the probability that the litigant will win the injunction not
the lawsuit. Substitution of the probability that the injunction will issue in the place of the
merit probability is sensible so long as the injunction's merits are a microcosm of the case's
merits. Additionally, it could be argued that the harm to be experienced by one of the parties
is conditional upon the judge's injunction decision.
However, such a solution is second-best. The injunction is concerned with the needless
loss borne by a litigant who does ultimately prevail at trial. As between the merits probability
and the injunction probability, the merits probability is the more accurate barometer of the
degree of needlessness of the loss suffered. The merits probability therefore, should be used to
evaluate the loss. One can consult any judge to discover that the merit probability and the
probability of winning the injunction are different numbers although similar in magnitude.
Under no circumstances should the preceding comment be construed as a trivialization of
the path-breaking work of Professor Leubsdorf in the field of preliminary injunction law. This
author is appreciative of, and intellectually indebted to, the work of Professor Leubsdorf in
this regard.
Fourth, it could be argued that use of the merit probability is incorrect because such use is
inconsistent with the "preponderance of the evidence" and "beyond a reasonable doubt" bur-
den of proof standards. That is, cases with merit probabilities of less than 50% would always
be dismissed by judges since the value of their merit probabilities would suggest that burden of
proof standards of greater than 50% could never be met. Since in reality judges do not actu-
ally dismiss such suits, the argument proceeds, then it cannot be true that the merit probability
is the probability actually used by judges who are in effect using the Posner Rule.
This fourth argument is also unavailing since it seems to embody the classically erroneous
assumption that the merit probability has a significance apart from its usefulness in making the
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uniform standard for granting preliminary injunctions. It has also been
asserted that the Posner Rule minimizes the social loss resulting from
judicial errors which attend the issuance of preliminary injunctions.30 1
The PRPHM provides a means of demonstrating the Rule's universality
in this regard. As a heuristic and analytical device, this Matrix captures
the tradeoff between the relative probability of irreparable harm and the
relative magnitude of irreparable harm to the litigants given the issuance
or denial of the injunction. The Matrix can be used, and indeed was used
in this Article, to categorize the results of the many kinds of preliminary
injunction decisions handed down by the federal courts.
Regretfully, it is now time to close our momentary time warp.
Newton's theories are again as they once were. Twenty-first century law
may or may not be again as we have foreseen it.3"2 It can only be hoped
that the closing of this time warp is not coincidental with a closing of the
decision on whether or not to grant the preliminary injunction. The difficulty is one of distin-
guishing the probabilistic analysis in a regular trial setting from the analysis in a preliminary
injunction setting. In a trial, the evidence adduced must satisfy a criterion level of credibility.
However, in the preliminary injunction setting, the probability is a way of weighing the irrepa-
rable harm of the parties. It must be conceded that if "preponderance of the evidence" is the
burden of proof standard that the litigant has failed to meet in the hearing on the motion for
preliminary injunction, then such a failing may be tantamount to not having a likelihood of
succeeding on the merits. The insight afforded by the Posner Rule, however, is that even if a
party has a small probability of succeeding on the merits, this fact alone should not lead to a
denial of the preliminary injunction. This probability must be assessed in conjunction with the
harm to which it is attached, and it is this resultant quantity that must be balanced against the
expected harm to the opposing litigant.
Finally, it could be argued that, assuming arguendo that the merit probability is the cor-
rect probability to use, it is still true that the Posner Rule model is erroneous since the merit
probability is inconsistently applied in the model. That is, the probability of the single event
that one party will win should be the single probability used to discount the harms of both
parties since these harms will flow from that single event.
This fifth argument is erroneous because it is based on a misunderstanding of statistical
axioms. If an event is defined to be that outcome which is the only possible outcome of an
experiment, it cannot be true as assumed by the fifth argument that the trial itself is the event.
The trial has two possible outcomes: the plaintiff can win or the defendant can win. These are
the relevant events. Further, under the statistical definition of the compliment of an event as
that which occurs when the event itself does not occur, it follows that judgment for the plain-
tiff is a compliment of judgment for the defendant. Since the probability of the compliment of
an event and the probability of the event itself must sum to one, this implies that the
probability of judgment for the plaintiff plus the probability of judgment for the defendant
must sum to one. Symbolically, this implies that if the probability of judgment for the plaintiff
is P, the probability of judgment for the defendant must be 1-P.
In sum, the Posner Rule cannot be defeated with the argument that the merit probability
is the inappropriate probability to use in the analysis.
301. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
302. As Heisenberg has pointed out by means of his Uncertainty Principle, observation is
not necessarily passive. See generally D. BOHM, supra note 3, at 81-84 (discussing
Heisenberg's Uncertainty or Indeterminancy Principle). It is indeed possible that this Article
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reader's mind. Such an unhappy event harks back to a time when law-
yers, judges and legal scholars "[concealed] the difficulties of the prelimi-
nary injunction decision under bland generalizations. ' 30 3  Now,
hopefully "all of these matters [have] come into the light" 3" of the Pos-
ner Rule. It is indeed "easier to find and follow the injunctions of rea-
son."30 5 Welcome, reader (perhaps) to twenty-first century law.
may have altered the reader's perception of the Posner Rule, the PRPHM, Law and Econom-
ics, or any combination thereof. Such change might affect the path of the law.
303. Leubsdorf, supra note 43, at 566.
304. Id.
305. Id.
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